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PRESIDENTIAL CERTIFICATIONS IN U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY LEGISLATION
MARK A. CHINEN "
In 1997 and 1998, the Clinton Administration certified
that Mexico was one of several major drug-producing or drug-
trafficking countries that had "cooperated fully with the
United States" to achieve full compliance with international
anti-narcotics goals.' Many argued that there ias substantial
evidence that Mexico should not be certified;2 however, the
* Assistant Professor, Seattle University School of Law. Many thanks to
Janet Ainsworth, Anne Enquist, and Ronald Slye for their comments and
suggestions. Thanks also to Erin Karp for her research assistance.
1. Certification for Major Narcotics Producing and Transit Countries
[Presidential Determination No. 97-18], 62 Fed. Reg. 11,589 (1997) (certify-
ing Mexico for 1997). The other countries certified were Aruba, the Baha-
mas, Bolivia, Brazil, Cambodia, China, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Guatemala, Haiti, Hong Kong, India, Jamaica, Laos, Malaysia, Panama, Para-
guay, Peru, Taiwan, Thailand, Venezuela, and Vietnam. See id. The Clinton
Administration also certified Belize, Lebanon, and Pakistan on grounds of
national interest, but chose not to certify Afghanistan, Burma, Colombia,
Iran, Nigeria, or Syria. See id. See also Certification for Major Illicit Drug
Producing and Drug Transit Countries [Presidential Determination No. 98-
15], 63 Fed. Reg. 12,937 (1998) (certif~ing Mexico for 1998). The other
countries certified were Aruba, the Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, China,
the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Hong Kong, India, Ja-
maica, Laos, Malaysia, Panama, Peru, Taiwan, Thailand, Venezuela, and
Vietnam. Cambodia, Colombia, Pakistan, and Paraguay were certified on na-
tional interest grounds. Afghanistan, Burma, Iran, and Nigeria were not cer-
tified. See id. See also Douglas Farah, Despile Objections, Clinton Administration
Certifies Mexico as Drug-Fighting Partne; WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 1998, at A33;
Tim Golden, U.S. Lauds Mexico on Drug Efforts, CounteringfD.E.A., NY. Ti. S,
Feb. 27, 1998, at Al. As this article was being prepared for publication, on
February 26, 1999, the Clinton Administration issued another certification
for Mexico. Certification for Major Illicit Drug Producing and Drug Transit
Countries [Presidential Determination No. 99-15], 64 Fed. Reg. 11,319
(1999). Again, the certification was issued despite criticism of Mexico's ef-
forts to stop the flow of narcotics through the country. Se Christopher S.
Wren, U.S. Gives Colombia and Mexico Nod on Drugs, N.Y. Ti.IES, Feb. 27,
1999, at A6.
2. In 1997, the certification was issued just weeks after Mexico's top
drug enforcement officer, Gutierrez Rebello, had been arrested on suspi-
cion of receiving bribes from Mexican drug traffickers. SeJulia Preston, Mex-
ico'sDrug Czar. Busted, N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 23, 1997, § 4, at 2. In 1998, the certi-
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certifications allowed Mexico to escape economic sanctions
that otherwise would have been imposed by statute.
3
In January 1998, the Administration certified that China
had "provided clear and unequivocal assurances to the United
States that it is not assisting and will not assist any nonnuclear-
weapon state, either directly or indirectly, in acquiring nuclear
explosive devices or the material and components for such de-
vices."'4 Again, others argued that the certification was not jus-
tified,5 but the certification allowed the United States to imple-
fication was made despite allegations that a report by the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) had found that Mexico had not met its anti-narcotics
goals and had not cooperated with the U.S. government in reaching those
goals. See Farah, supra note 1, at A33. Thomas Constantine, administrator of
the DEA, denied the existence of such a report in hearings before a House
subcommittee, but stated that he did not believe that Mexico had accom-
plished its counter-narcotics goals or had succeeded in cooperating with the
U.S. government in anti-narcotics efforts. See Departments of Commerce, Justice,
and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1999: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Justice, State, and theJudiciary Appropriations,
105th Cong. 479-81 (1998).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 75-80.
4. Certification Pursuant to Section (b) (1) of Public Law 99-183 and to
Section 902(a) (6) (B) of Public Law 101-246 [Presidential Determination
No. 98-10], 63 Fed. Reg. 3447 (1998). See generally Tim Weiner, US. Says
China Isn't Helping Others Build Nuclear Bombs, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 11, 1997, at A5
(discussing background for the certification).
5. Concerns were heightened after it was reported that, in the month
the certification was issued, U.S. officials had discovered and stopped secret
negotiations between China and Iran over the sale of chemicals that could
be used to enrich uranium for use in a nuclear explosive device. See Barton
Gellman & John Pomfret, U.S. Action Stymied China Sale to Iran; Chemiral In-
volved Can Be Used to Enrich Uranium, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 1998, at Al. In
anticipation of the certification, in November 1997, the House of Represent-
atives approved a bill that would have extended from 30 to 120 days the time
within which Congress could review a certification. See Political Freedom in
China Act of 1997, H.R. 2358, 105th Cong. (1997). See generally Ashcroft: Clin-
ton Summit Decision was Wrong, U.S. NEvsWvipE, Mar. 13, 1998, available in
LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File (discussing Senator Ashcroft's opposi-
tion to U.S. nuclear cooperation with China); Clinton's Troubled China Deal:
VWhy Congress is Suspicious of Promises of Good Behaviour, FOREIGN REPORT, Nov.
27, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File (discussing Con-
gressional concerns over the then-anticipated certification); Tim Weiner,
U.S. Weighs Deal to Halt Missile-Gear Sales by China, N.Y. TINIES, Mar. 19, 1998,
at A8 (discussing a report by the Congressional Research Service that China
may be violating its commitment to abide by the Missile Technology Control
Regime guidelines and reports by the U.S. intelligence community that
China may be selling military technology to Iran and Pakistan).
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ment a bilateral agreement it had entered into with China in
1985,6 which in turn opened the door for U.S. companies to
sell nuclear technology to China for civilian use.
Much of the debate surrounding these certifications fo-
cuses on whether they were justified. However there is also a
question as to whether certifications should be required at all.
Certification requirements-laws that require the President to
certify as to particular conditions before acting 7 -appear
throughout U.S. foreign policy legislation.8 At least once in
each administration, certifications have exposed the executive
branch to severe criticism. A number of scholars9 have dis-
cussed the requirements and their value, but more than a dec-
ade has passed since they have been examined in any detail.
I have two purposes in this article. The first is to assess
the value of certification requirements by describing their op-
eration in foreign affairs legislation and by accounting for
their use and the controversies that attend them. I argue that
6. Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear
Energy, July 23, 1985, U.S.-China, T.I.AS. No. 12027.
7. Quite often, the term "certification" is used to describe the entire
anti-narcotics review process. This article, however, looks at narrower legisla-
tive provisions, which may or may not be part of a wider review process,
which prevent the President from acting, or which require him to act, unless
he makes a certification of some kind.
8. In this article, the terms "foreign policy" and "foreign affairs" are in-
tended to include defense matters.
9. See, e.g., Barry E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Inproting the
Haphazard U.S. Legal Regime, 75 Cu. L. REV. 1162 (1987) (citing certifica-
tions as an example of how difficult it is for Congress to control the Presi-
dent in foreign affairs matters and discussing how certifications can be tight-
ened to strengthen such controls); FrankJ. Garcia, Americas Agrermnes-An
Interim Stage in Building the Free Trade Area of the Americas, 35 COLU.t.J. Tk, s-
N&T'L L. 63, 100 n.198 (1997) (discussing foreign states' attitudes towards
periodic requalifications for U.S. assistance); Amy S. Griffin, Comment, Con-
stitutional Impediments to Enforcing Human Rights Legislation: The Case of El Sal-
vador, 33 ArM. U. L. REv. 163 (1983) (discussing weaknesses in certification
requirements in human rights legislation); Scott Horton & Randy Sellier,
Commentary, The Utility of Presidential Certifications of Compliance 171h United
States Human Rights Polioy: The Case of El Salvador, 1982 Wis. L RE'. 825;John
Norton Moore, The Secret War in Central America and the Future of Worfd Order,
80 Am. J. INT'L L. 43, 69 (1986) (discussing a controversial certification by
the Carter administration that Nicaragua %%-as not assisting rebels in El Salv,-
dor); Peter E. Quint, The Separation of Powe Under Carter, 62 TEx. L REv.
785, 826-27 (1984) (discussing certification requirements and other Con-
gressional methods to restrain the executive branch in foreign affairs).
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these requirements result from unanswered questions about
the respective roles of the legislative and executive branches in
the formulation and implementation of U.S. foreign policy.' 0
The requirements serve a number of purposes, of which the
two most frequently cited are: 1) to control the executive
branch in foreign affairs and 2) to influence foreign states.
However, certification requirements are limited in their ability
to perform either function-one reason why they are often
criticized. Nevertheless, certification requirements perform
other important tasks: they focus and encourage public debate
on foreign policy matters; they help Congress and the Presi-
dent avoid or defuse harmful confrontations; and they shift
the burden and the risk of decision-making from the legisla-
tive branch to the executive.
These sometimes conflicting purposes help to explain
both the controversies that certification requirements engen-
der and their widespread use despite such controversies. Be-
cause of their several uses, certification requirements are likely
to remain part of U.S. foreign affairs legislation, but not with-
out cost. If used too often, they hamper the executive
branch's ability to conduct foreign policy and strain U.S. rela-
tions with other countries. But the greatest cost of certifica-
tion requirements is that they encourage cynicism that is
harmful to the rule of law.
The second purpose of this article is to suggest ways to
minimize the costs of certification requirements. I argue that
the number of certification requirements should be reduced.
If Congress nevertheless wants to impose such requirements,
either they should be drafted narrowly-so that it is clear
when such requirements have been satisfied-or they should
be drafted broadly-again, so that there is no question as to
whether a certification is justified. Electing one of these alter-
natives is important because it is highly unlikely that such re-
quirements will be subject to judicial review.
My findings are presented in four sections. I begin by
sketching the features of certification requirements in current
legislation. Next, I discuss the constitutional background out
10. In taking this approach, I am indebted to scholars such as Harold
Koh, who have discussed these recurring questions in other foreign policy
contexts. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President (Ahnost) Alvays Wins in
Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE L. J. 1255 (1988).
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of which these requirements arise. Then, in what forms the
greater part of this article, I describe and evaluate the several
uses of certification requirements. I follow with a discussion of
the costs such requirements impose and my recommendations
for minimizing those costs.
I. Cu RENr LEGISLATION
Black's Law Dictionary defines a "certificate" as a "Titten
assurance, or official representation, that some act has or has
not been done, or some event occurred, or some legal formal-
ity has been complied with" 1 and a "certification" as "[t]he
formal assertion in writing of some facL" 1 2 Congress often en-
acts legislation that requires the President to issue a certificate
as to specific facts or conditions before he may act in a foreign
policy matter. For example, before May 1998, the President
was required to certify to Congress, before providing military
assistance to Pakistan, that Pakistan did not "possess a nuclear
explosive device and that the proposed United States military
assistance program [would] reduce significantly the risk that
Pakistan will possess a nuclear explosive device."13 Before pro-
viding economic assistance to the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, the President had to certify that the Congo was "coop-
erating fully with investigators from the United Nations in ac-
counting for human rights violations committed in the Demo-
cratic Republic of Congo or adjacent countries."' 4 Before ex-
panding diplomatic ties with Vietnam, he had to certify that
the Vietnamese government was cooperating fully in account-
ing for missing prisoners of war and persons missing in ac-
tion.15
Certification requirements appeared early in U.S. his-
tory.' 6 However, in the area of foreign affairs, they became
11. BLACK's LAw DICTONARY 225 (6th ed. 1990).
12. Id. at 227.
13. 22 U.S.C. § 2375(e) (1994).
14. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appro-
priations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-118, § 585, 111 Stat. 2386 (1997).
15. See Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 609, 111
Stat. 2440 (1997).
16. Such certifications involved both foreign and domestic policy. Se,
e.g., Act of 1789 (providing that payment due to members and officers of the
Senate shall be certified by the President and that the certificate is a suffi-
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much more common in the 1970s, following two decades of
relative acquiescence to the President, when Congress began
to reassert itself in this area.17 Since then, the number of certi-
cient warrant of payment); Act of Aug. 5, 1854, 10 Stat. 587 (1854) (imple-
menting Treaty Between the United States and the United Kingdom, signed
June 1, 1854, and, among other things, providing for the elimination of cer-
tain customs duties on imports from Canada, upon a Presidential proclama-
tion that he had received evidence that "the Imperial Parliament of Great
Britain, and the Provincial Parliaments of Canada, New Brunswick, Nova
Scotia, and Prince Edard's Island, have passed laws on their part to give full
effect to the provisions of the treaty. . ."); Act of Feb. 28, 1920, Ch. 91, 41
Stat. 474, 476-77 (1920) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1 (15) (1925-26)) (authoriz-
ing the Interstate Commerce Commission to give preference to certain ship-
ments upon a Presidential certification that "such preferences and priorities
are essential to the national defense and security 'in time of war or
threatened war'").
17. See Stephen B. Cohen, Conditioning U.S. Security Assistance on Hu man
Rights Practices, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 246 (1982) (discussing the legislative his-
tory and executive implementation of § 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act,
one of the first pieces of legislation representing Congress's growing asser-
tiveness in foreign affairs). See also STEPHEN E. AMBROSE & DOUciS G.
BRINKLEY, RISE TO GLOBALISM: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1938, 2,13-45
(8th rev. ed. 1997) (discussing Congress's increasing involvement in foreign
affairs).
One of the earliest certification requirements in foreign affairs was ad-
ded to the so-called first Hickenlooper Amendment. 22 U.S.C. § 2370
(1994). The amendment was enacted in 1962 in response to the expropria-
tion of U.S. property by foreign countries, such as Cuba. Under the amend-
ment, the President must terminate economic assistance to the government
of any country that has seized the property of U.S. citizens or has committed
equivalent acts. See id. At the time of its enactment, there was no waiver
provision in the statute. The amendment was used sporadically andt with
mixed reviews. See BARRY E. CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 689-90 (2d ed. 1995).
In 1973, however, Congress inserted a waiver provision into the statute
that provided that the President may not vaive the provisions of the amend-
ment "unless the President determines and certifies that such a waiver is
important to the national interests of the United States." 22 U.S.C.
§ 2370(e) (1). The President is required to report such a waiver immediately
to Congress. See id.
Certification requirements are but one of several legislative tools em-
ployed by Congress that reflect its growing assertiveness in foreign affairs.
Other statutes have provided Congress's position on foreign policy issues.
Other legislation has required the President to notify Congress after taking
action on a foreign affairs matter. Still other pieces have required the Presi-
dent to consult with Congress before taking such action, earmarked appro-
priations for specific foreign policy purposes, provided for legislative vetoes
of Presidential actions, or prohibited certain acts altogether. Often these
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• fication requirements has mushroomed. Many appear in ma-
jor pieces of foreign policy legislation such as the Foreign
Assistance Act' 8 and the Arms Export Control Act.' If one
counts individual provisions that appear ithin those Acts, as
well as those found in other legislation, certification require-
ments now appear in more than one hundred provisions relat-
ing to U.S. foreign policy.20 Certification requirements figure
in almost every major U.S. foreign policy issue: the use of
force, 21 human rights, 22 narcotics,23 terrorism, 2. arms control
measures were used in the same legislation. Sce, e.g., National Defense Au-
thorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998, Pub. L No. 105-85, §§ 1202-1203, 111
Stat. 1629 (1997). Section 1202 states the position of Congress with respect
to the presence of ground forces in Bosnia. Id. § 1202. Subsection 1203(a)
then prohibits any funds appropriated or othernise made available to the
Department of Defense for fiscal year 1998 or thereafter from being used for
deploying U.S. ground forces in Bosnia, unless the President, after consult-
ing with bipartisan leadership in Congress, transmits to Congress a certifica-
tion:
(1) that the continued presence of United States ground combat
forces, afterJune 30, 1998, in the Republic of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina is required in order to meet the national security in-
terests of the United States; and
(2) that afterJune 30, 1998, it ill remain United States policy that
United States ground forces will not serve as, or be used is,
civil police in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Id. § 1203(a). Finally, subsection 1203(b) requires the President to provide
a detailed report justifying and describing the continued presence of such
forces in Bosnia.
18. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151-2430i (1994).
19. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2751-2799aa-2.
20. See infra, Appendix.
21. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (1994). See also supra note 17.
22. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2304. No security assistance may be given, and
no licenses for the export of crime control equipment may be issued, to a
country whose government is engaged in gross violations of intemationali
recognized human rights, unless the President certifies that "extraordinary
circumstances exist warranting provision of such assistance and issuance of
such licenses." Id. Similarly, military training and education may not be
provided to such a country, unless the President certifies that "extraordinan
circumstances exist warranting provision of such assistance." 22 U.S.C.
§ 2347.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 75-80.
24. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2781 (Supp. I1 1994). No defense articles or sen-
ices may be sold or licensed for export to a country wlhich the President
certifies "is not cooperating fully with United States antiterrorism efforts."
Id However, the President may waive this restriction ith respect to a spe-
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and nuclear non-proliferation, 25 and the Middle East con-
flict.2 6 They appear in legislation governing U.S. relations
with countries such as Afghanistan,27 Angola,28 Burma,9-
Greece,30 Ireland, 31 Japan,32 the countries of the Middle
cific transaction if the President determines that "the transaction is impor-
tant to the national interests of the United States." Id.
25. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2799aa-1 (1994). The President may waive eco-
nomic sanctions against a country which is involved in the transfer of nu-
clear reprocessing technology or the transfer or use of nuclear explosive de-
vices if, with respect to a country involved with the transfer of reprocessing
technology, he certifies that "the termination of such assistance would be
seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States nonproliferation
objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security," or,
with respect to a country involved in the transfer or use of a nuclear explo-
sive device, he certifies "that an immediate imposition of sanctions on that
country would be detrimental to the national security of the United States."
Id.
26. See, e.g., Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1994 and
1995, Pub. L. No. 103-236, § 564, 108 Stat. 382, 484 (1994), as amended b y
Foreign Relations Laws Technical Amendments, Pub. L. No. 103-415, § 1 (l),
108 Stat. 4299, 4301 (1994). Defense assistance may not be given to a gov-
ernment or international organization which, as a matter of policy, has asked
for compliance or requested information in connection with the Arab boy-
cott of Israel, unless the President determines and certifies to Congress that
"that country or organization does not currently maintain a policy or prac-
tice of making such requests or solicitations." Id. See also Presidential Deter-
mination No. 96-41, 61 Fed. Reg. 43,137 (1996), pursuant to the Middle East
Peace Facilitation Act of 1995, Title VI, Foreign Operations, Export Financ-
ing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-107,
§ 603(c), 110 Stat. 755, 758-59 (1997).
27. See infra note 39.
28. See 12 U.S.C. § 635(b)(11) (1994). Angola is not eligible for Export-
Import Bank of the United States (Exim Bank) financing for most products
and services unless the President certifies that free and fair elections have
been held in Angola and other steps towards democratization have been
taken.
29. See Exec. Order No. 13,047, 3 C.F.R. 202 (1998).
30. See 22 U.S.C. § 2373(d) (1994). Before providing security assistance
to Greece or Turkey, the President must certify that the furnishing of such
assistance will be consistent with certain principles set forth in the statute.
31. See Presidential Determination No. 97-33, 62 Fed. Reg. 53,217 (1997),
certifying Ireland under § 5(c) of the Anglo-Irish Agreement Support Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-415, 100 Stat. 947, 948 (1986).
32. See Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1991, Pub. 1L No.
101-511, § 8105, 104 Stat. 1856, 1902 (1990). Subsection (b) provides for
annual reductions in the number of military personnel in Japan, unless the
President certifies before the end of each fiscal year that 'Japan has agreed
to offset for that fiscal year the direct costs incurred by the United States
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East,33 North Korea,34 Pakistan,35 and the states of the former
Soviet Union36 and of the former Yugoslavia. 37 They also are
present in legislation governing U.S. relations ith multilateral
organizations, such as the United Nations. 3"
Certification requirements vary widely in their content.
Some are primarily statements of policy, for example: "[t]he
proposed action is in the national security interest of the
United States." Others are primarily statements of fact: "coun-
try X does not possess nuclear weapons" or "[t]he government
of Afghanistan has apologized officially and assumes responsi-
bility for the death of Ambassador Adolph Dubs .. . Still
others might be described as a mixture of statements of fact,
policy, and sometimes law-"military assistance to [cl]ountry X
will reduce the risk that [c]ountry X will develop or procure
nuclear weapons on its own," "country X is not engaged in a
consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recog-
nized human rights," or "country X has not implemented laws
related to the presence of all United States military personnel in Japan. ex-
cluding the military personnel title costs." Id. § 8105(b).
33. See supra note 26.
34. See infra note 84.
35. See supra text accompanying note 13.
36. See infra note 40 and text accompanying note 161.
37. See Presidential Determination No. 97-26, 62 Fed. Reg. 32,015 (1997)
(waiving a prohibition of certain assistance to Serbia and Montenegro under
§ 1511 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub.
L. No. 103-160, 107 Stat. 1547, 1840 (1993) and § 540 of the Omniibs Con-
solidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009,
3009-155 (1997)).
38. See 50 U.S.C. § 404g(a) (1) (1994). No intelligence infornation mai
be provided to the United Nations or its affiliates unless the President certi-
fies to Congress that "the Director of Central Intelligence, in consultaion
with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, has established and
implemented procedures, and has worked ith the United Nations to en-
sure implementation of procedures, for protecting from unauthorized dis-
closure United States intelligence sources and methods connected to such
information." Id. The President may waive this requirement if he certifies to
Congress that "providing such information to the United Nations or an or-
ganization affiliated with the United Nations, or to any officials or employees
thereof, is in the national security interests of the United States." 5U U.S.C.
§ 404g(a) (2).
39. 22 U.S.C. § 2374 (a) (1994).
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which discriminate against religious organizations, in violation
of its obligations under international law."40
Most of these requirements are part of legislation that de-
termines whether countries are eligible for U.S. economic or
military assistance. Several important examples are given
above, including the annual anti-narcotics review process dis-
cussed in the introduction. 41 In this regard, and as mentioned
earlier, "certification" is sometimes used to refer to an entire
process which requires countries to "re-qualify" for economic
assistance.
Finally, some requirements allow Congress to overturn
the President's certification of a country. A good example is
legislation on nuclear nonproliferation. The Arms Export Act
forbids, among other things, economic or military assistance
to any country that delivers or receives nuclear enrichment
equipment, materials, or technology, unless certain statutory
conditions are met.42 However, the President may waive this
40. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appro-
priations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-118, § 577, 111 Stat. 2386, 2433-34
(1997). A certification's content is an important factor in determining
whether the courts can review a Presidential certification.
41. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3 and infra text accompanying
notes 75-80. See also 22 U.S.C. § 2373 (1994) (requiring a certification
before military assistance may be provided to Turkey or Greece); 22 U.S.C.
§ 2781 (Supp. 111984) (prohibiting defense articles or services to be sold or
licensed for export to a country that the President certifies "is not cooperat-
ing fully with United States antiterrorism efforts"); Iraq Sanctions Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-513, § 586H, 104 Stat. 2047, 2052-53 (1990) (authoriz-
ing the President to use a certification to waive economic sanctions against
Iraq).
An important exception, however, is the War Powers Resolution, which
is intended to control the President's ability to use U.S. armed forces
abroad. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1542-48 (1994). Under the Resolution, the President
must report to Congress within 48 hours of introducing U.S. armed forces
into hostilities or in other specified situations. Within 60 days of submission
of the report by the President, the President must terminate the use of U.S.
armed forces unless Congress declares war, the 60-day limit is extended by
law, or in the case of armed attack on the United States. The 60-day period
may be extended for an additional 30 days if the President certifies to Con-
gress that "unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of United
States Armed Forces requires the continued use of such armed forces in the
course of bringing about a prompt removal of such forces." 50 U.S.C.
§ 1544(b).
42. See 22 U.S.C. § 2799aa (1994). The supplying and receiving countries
must agree to place all such items under multilateral supervision when avail-
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ban if he certifies that "termination of such assistance would
have a serious adverse effect on vital United States interests"
and that "he has received reliable assurances that the country
in question will not acquire or develop nuclear weapons or as-
sist other nations in doing so." 43 Certification takes effect
when it is received by Congress; 44 however, the statute gives
Congress thirty days after receiving the certification to disap-
prove such assistance by joint resolution.' 5 If the joint resolu-
tion is adopted, the President's certification ceases to be effec-
tive and all aid must stop.
46
Certification requirements are common and in most cases
certifications are issued without comment. However, every so
often, as in the cases of Mexico and China discussed earlier,
certifications become centers of controversy. The Reagan Ad-ministration was severely criticized for certifying that the gov-
ernment of El Salvador had met certain human rights criteria
which qualified it to receive U.S. economic and military assist-
ance during the 1980s.4 7 A less familiar controversy sur-
rounded a certification by the Bush Administration in the
early 1990s which made Peru eligible for U.S. assistance.
Under the International Narcotics Control Act of 1990,8' the
President was required to certify that Peru had met detailed
requirements with respect to human rights before Peru %%-as
eligible to receive anti-narcotics assistance. 49 In 1991, the
State Department issued a determination that Peru had met
able, or the receiving country must agree with the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency to place all such items under the safeguards system of the
Agency.
43. 22 U.S.C. § 2799aa (b)(1).
44. See 22 U.S.C. § 2799aa (b) (2) (A).
45. Seeid.
46. See id.
47. See Horton & Sellier, supra note 9, at 842-55.
48. International Narcotics Control Act of 1990, Pub. L No. 101- 623,
104 Stat. 3350 (1990).
49. In particular, § 4 of the Act required the President to determine thait:
(1) that country is implementing programs to reduce the flow of
cocaine to the United States in accordance with a bilateral or
multilateral agreement, to which the United States is a party,
that contains specific, quantitative and qualitative, perform-
ance criteria with respect to those programs;
(2) the armed forces and law enforcement agencies of that country
are not engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights, and ie government
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the human rights standard and announced a package of $60
million in budgetary assistance and $35 million in military
assistance under the Act.50 In its determination, the State De-
partment argued that: "[N]either we nor major human ights
groups within Peru believe that the democratically elected gov-
ernment of Peru is engaged in a consistent pattern of gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights."' In
pressing its case, the State Department argued that President
Fujimori had not been personally involved in any human
rights abuses by the military; the Department also noted that
progress was being made in three prominent pending human
rights cases. Nevertheless, the certification met with protest.
Members of the human rights community argued that there
was no basis for such a determination. Congressional hearings
were held on the certification, in which one member of Con-
gress essentially accused the Bush Administration of lyingr
'2
of that country has made significant progress in protecting in-
ternationally recognized human rights, particularly in -
(A) ensuring that torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treat-
ment or punishment, incommunicado detention or de-
tention without charges and trial, disappearances, and
other flagrant denials of the right to life, liberty, or secur-
ity of the person, are not practiced; and
(B) permitting an unimpeded investigation of alleged viola-
tions of internationally recognized human rights, includ-
ing providing access to places of detention, by appropriate
international organizations (including nongovernmental
organizations such as the International Committee of the
Red Cross) or groups acting under the authority of the
United Nations or the Organization of American States;
and
(3) the government of that country has effective control over po-
lice and military operations related to counter-narcotics and
counterinsurgency activities.
Id. § 4, 104 Stat. 3353-54.
50. See Determination Under Section 4(a) of the International Narcotics
Control Act of 1990, 56 Fed. Reg. 38, 165 (1991); Holly Burkhalter, The Pent-
vian PR Coup on Capitol Hill, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 23, 1991, at 26. The power
to make the determination had been delegated to the State Department.
51. Dep't State, International Narcotics Control Act of 1990:Justification
for Determination: Peru, reprinted in Review of the Presidential Determination on
Narcotics Control and Human Rights in Peru: Hearings Before the House Comm. on
Foreign Affairs, 102d Cong. 171 (1991) [hereinafter Human Rights in Peru].
52. See id. at 75 (statement of Ted Weiss, Chairman, Committee on Gov-
ernmental Operations, Subcommittee on Human Resources and Intergov-
ernmental Relations, stating that "It seems... [that] it is counterproductive
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In the end, Congress and the Bush Administration compro-
mised by delaying $10 million in military assistance. 3
What accounts for the controversies to which these legisla-
tive tools give rise? A partial answer comes from an examina-
tion of the constitutional realities that underlie the require-
ments, a topic I will now address.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL UNCERTAINTY
Certification requirements can be explained in large part
as manifesting and responding to the tensions inherent in a
system, like that of the United States, in which national power
is distributed among several branches of government5" Such
tensions are particularly heightened in foreign affairs. The
U.S. Constitution empowers both the executive and legislative
branches to act in foreign matters, but the lines of responsibil-
ity are blurred.55 Article I gives Congress several powers perti-
to have the law on the books which we then not only ignore, but make fratd-
ulent statements which everybody, on all sides, knows are fraudulent.").
53. See Eugene Robinson, U.S. Drug-Fighting Program in Peru "Fnonnously
Delayed," WASH. Posr, Nov. 24, 1991, at A28.
54. The policies underlying the separation of powers are well known.
National power is distributed among the three branches in part to promote
efficiency. Each branch is uniquely structured to fulfill a particular role in
national government. The hallmark of this efficiency %as the concentration
of the executive power in a President able to act with dispatch. Se GEoFREv
R. STONE ET AL., CoNSTITUTIONAL LA A 363 (2d ed. 1991).
At the same time, power is dispersed to prevent tyranny. Sre Myers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis,J., dissenting) (stating that
the "doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted... not to promote
efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was,
not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to tle
distribution of governmental powers among three departments, to save tie
people from autocracy."). The separation of powers attempts to ensure that
those who make law do not execute it, thereby seeking to prevent power
from being concentrated in one branch of government at the expense of the
governed. It also seeks to limit the reach of government by requiring a
broad consensus among the three branches of government before such
power can be exerted against the citizenry. Finally, it is meant to reduce tle
risk that factions will exercise undue influence over government. See SToNE
ETr A., supra, at 362-67.
55. The problem has been much discussed in the literature. For exam-
ple, see the debates between Alexander Hamilton and James Monroe, writ-
ing under the pseudonyms Pacificus and Helvidius, reprinted in TiE l-rrEmR
OF PACIFICUS AND HELVIDIUS ON THE PRocLAATION OF NELrLu.rrv" OF 1793
(Scholars' Facsimiles and Reprints 1976). See also EuEN C. CoLuER, Hot'sE
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nent to foreign affairs, including the power to "lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises;" to "provide for the com-
mon Defense and general Welfare of the United States;" to
"regulate Commerce with foreign Nations;" to "define and
punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and
Offences against the Law of Nations;" to "declare" war; to
"raise and support Armies;" and to "provide and maintain a
Navy. ' 56 At the same time, Article II grants the President pow-
ers relevant to foreign affairs: the "executive Power shall be
vested" in the President;5 7 the President serves as Commander
in Chief of the armed forces;58 he has the power-with the
advice and consent of the Senate-to make treaties and ap-
point ambassadors;59 and he is to receive ambassadors and
other public ministers from other countries.60 Not surpris-
ingly, this division of power sometimes has led to disagree-
ments between the two branches in the formulation and im-
plementation of foreign policy. 61
Courts and commentators have identified a number of
principles to help overcome this impasse: reliance on the con-
stitutional text, the Framers' intent, custom, and the relative
COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, STRENGTHENING EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE CONSUL-
TATION ON FOREIGN PoLIcY, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print No. 8 1983);
EDWARD S. CORWIN ET. AL., THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND PowERS, 1787-1984:
HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF PRACTICE AND OPINION (5th rev. ed. 1984);
MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY (1990); Louis HENKIN,
CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1990); Koh, supra
note 10; VICTORIA MARIE KRAFT, THE U.S. CONSTITUTION & FOREIGN POLICY.
TERMINATING THE TAIwAN TREATY (Contributions in Political Science No.
270, Bernard K.Johnpoll ed., 1991); Thomas E. Mann, Making Foreign Policy:
President and Congress, in A QUESTION OF BALANCE: THE PRESIDENT, THF CON-
GRESS, AND FOREIGN POLICY 1 (Thomas E. Mann ed., 1990); Stefan A. Riesen-
feld, The Powers of the Congress and the President in International Relations: Revis-
ited, 75 CAL. L. REv. 405 (1987); Eugene W. Rostow, Special Issue: The United
States Constitution in its Third Century: Foreign Affairs: Distribution of Constitu-
tional Authority: President, Prime Minister or Constitutional Monarch?, 83 AM. J.
INT'L L. 740 (1989).
56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
57. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
58. See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
59. See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
60. See id. art. II, § 3.
61. Disputes arose as early as Washington's day, when Congress protested
Washington's declaration of U.S. neutrality in the war between France and
England and his refusal to provide documents relevant to the negotiation of
the Jay treaty. See CORWIN ET. AL., supra note 55, at 212.
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strengths of each branch in engaging in foreign affairs. 6 -
Although each approach has influenced decision-making in
this area, none is completely dispositive. For example, there is
a strong argument that, all things being equal, the constitu-
tional text should control. But in most cases, the text is not
specific enough to provide more than general guidance in
resolving disputes between the executive and the legislative
branches in foreign affairs matters. One might look beyond
the constitutional text for other sources of guidance. The
Framers' intent is relevant, but such an approach presupposes
that it is possible to determine the Framers' intent with respect
to a particular issue. Alternatively, one may argue that the ex-
ecutive branch is simply better suited institutionally to conduct
foreign affairs.63 However, this approach presumes that effi-
ciency is paramount, when the Constitution may in fact accept,
and indeed mandate, inefficiency as the cost of preserving
other values.64
Despite this quandary, many commentators would agree
that today the executive branch is dominant in foreign af-
fairs.65 This dominance may stem from several factors: the
text of the Constitution; the influence of strong Presidents,
such as Washington, Jackson, Lincoln, and the two Roosevelts;
the comparative institutional abilities of the two political
62. See GLENNON, supra note 55, at 37-52.
63. See, e.g., THE FEDERALS No. 64 (John Jay), No. 70 (Alexander Ham-
ilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Alexander Hamilton argued:
That unity is conducive to energy will not be disputed. Decision,
activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize the pro-
ceedings of one man in a much more eminent degree than the
proceedings of any greater number, and in proportion as the
number is increased, these qualifies will be diminished.
Id. at No. 70, at 424. Because the conduct of foreign affairs requires deci-
sion, activity, secrecy, and dispatch, so the argument goes, the President, as
an individual, is much better suited for this role than Congress, as a collec-
tion of hundreds of individuals.
64. See GLENNON, supra note 55, at 47. See also supra note 52.
65. See, e.g., CorwN Em. At., supra note 55, at 215 ("From the point of
view of the present moment, it is not extravagant to say that immensely the most
important single factor in the deternination of American foreign polio has bee, presi-
dential guidance of it.") (emphasis in original); Koh, supra note 10, at 1291-
1318 (discussing reasons why the President is dominant in foreign affairs).
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branches; 66 and the reluctance of the courts to intrude in for-
eign policy matters.
This last factor is discussed in more detail in later sec-
tions. At this point it is important to note that: 1) the reluc-
tance on the part of the courts is real and 2) it is debatable
whether the judiciary should mediate between the legislative
and executive branches. Dean Choper, for example, has ar-
gued that the "federal judiciary should not decide constitu-
tional questions concerning the respective powers of Congress
and the President vis-A-vis one another; their final resolu-
tion [should] be remitted to the interplay of the national polit-
ical process." 67 In Choper's view, judicial intervention is un-
necessary because the legislative and executive branches have
tremendous incentives to guard their respective powers.',
Others, however, have argued that judicial intervention is nec-
essary to overcome the stalemate between the two political
branches.69 Regardless of how one comes out on this debate,
in reality we are governed by a system in which important
questions about the respective roles of the legislative and polit-
ical branches remain unanswered. As will be seen in the next
section, certification requirements both highlight and respond
to this constitutional uncertainty.
III. THE FUNCTIONS OF CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
One way to understand and assess the value of certifica-
tion requirements is to identify the purposes they serve and
then evaluate how well they meet these aims. Certification re-
quirements serve at least five purposes: 1) controlling execu-
66. In a Note discussing the roles of Congress and the President in U.S.
arms control policy, Kevin Sheehan asks whether a shift in control from the
President to Congress in arms control policy would result in better accounta-
bility. Kevin P. Sheehan, Note, Executive-Legislative Relations and the U.S. Arms
Export Control Regime in the Post-Cold War Era, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 179,
204 (1995). He observes that because of the Congressional committee struc-
ture, a shift in control would result in a shift in responsibility from the Presi-
dent, who is accountable to the entire nation, to committee chairs, who are
accountable only to their respective home states or districts. He also ques-
tions whether a shift in control would result in better policy. See id.
67. JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDiciAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITIuA. PRO-
cEss 263 (1982).
68. See id. at 275.
69. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 55, at 69-91 (arguing, among other
things, that judicial review is "necessary" in foreign affairs).
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tive action in foreign affairs (and, conversely, exerting Con-
gressional influence in U.S. foreign policy); 2) influencing the
behavior of foreign states; 3) focusing and encouraging debate
about foreign policy issues; 4) avoiding or diffusing confronta-
tions between the President and Congress in foreign affairs;
and 5) shifting the burden and risks of decision-making from
the legislative to the executive branch.
A. Controlling Executive Behavior
One of the main purposes of certification requirements is
to control the President in the area of foreign affairs and, con-
versely, to allow Congress to exert its influence in this area.
70
As will be discussed later, in difficult cases the requirements
70. This article leaves largely unexplored the important question of
whether Congress has the right to constrain the President in the first place.
The issues are complex. For example, suppose Congress enacted legislation
requiring the President to issue a certification before receiving the ambtssa-
dor of a country with which the United States had established diplomatic
relations. Such legislation would be highly suspect because the Constitution
expressly gives the President power to receive ambassadors; the certification
requirement would be seen as constraining a power expressly reserved to the
President.
Suppose, however, Congress enacts legislation that touches on a matter
clearly within the scope of its own powers, which nevertheless has a con-
straining effect on the President's powers. For example, Congress forbids
the President from using any funds appropriated by any act of Congress to
produce "lethal binary munitions," unless the President certifies that "the
production of such munitions is essential to the national interest." 50 U.S.C.
§ 1519(a) (1994). Congress holds the power of the purse, which metans that
Congress should have the power to determine how that purse is used. Sre,
e.g, Thomas M. Franck & Clifford A. Bob, The Retun of HumpY-Dumpty: For-
eign Relations Law after the Chadha Cas4 79 AM.J. INT'L L 912, 944 (1985)
("In seeking to co-determine U.S. foreign policy, Congress is on firmest con-
stitutional ground when it deploys its undoubted discretion over govern-
ment spending.") (citation omitted). But the prohibition may adversely af&
fect the President's ability to act as Commander in Chief.
Congress also prohibits the President from sharing with the United Na-
tions information gained from U.S. intelligence sources, unless the Presi-
dent certifies that adequate procedures have been implemented to protect
against "unauthorized disclosure of United States intelligence sources and
methods connected to such information." 50 U.S.C. § 404g(d)(1) (1994).
Here, Congress could argue that. such a prohibition is wvithin its power to
provide for the common defense, but the textual authority upon which Con-
gress can base this prohibition is less clear-certainly, it is not as specific as
the Constitutional provisions that give Congress the power of the purse. Se
Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
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are not effective in this regard. In theory, however, they have
some constraining effect on the executive branch.
Certification requirements shape decisions by requiring
the executive branch to take into account the concerns they
represent-they ensure that the President has covered all the
bases before making a foreign policy decision. For example,
by requiring the President to certify that China has made as-
surances that it is not engaged in proliferation activities, the
certification requirement forces the President to take that fac-
tor into account as he determines whether to further eco-
nomic relations with China.
In addition, certification requirements have formal char-
acteristics that may have a constraining effect on the executive
branch. A certification is a formal statement, often issued as a
Presidential determination. The formality of such a statement
alone may have a cautionary effect, but, more importantly, a
certification forces the President to go on record as having
stated that the substantive claims of a certification are true. A
President-whether acting in good faith, wanting to avoid the
embarrassment of being proven wrong, or simply unwilling to
be caught in a lie-will consider carefully whether there are
grounds for making such a representation. 7 1
Moreover, it is usually in the President's interest to coop-
erate with Congress, if only because the costs of acting unilat-
erally are high, particularly if Congress opposes the action.
For reasons discussed later, the President may be able to get
away with issuing a highly controversial certification, but his
ability to act in the future may be severely curtailed.72 For
71. Here, an analogy can be drawn to business certifications. Since cer-
tificates in business transactions tend to be relatively formal, they perform a
cautionary function by requiring the certifying party to consider carefully
the representations he or she is making. They also perform an evidentiary
function because an individual is on record as having made representations
about certain facts. Finally, they perform what might be termed a constitu-
five function, in that they serve as predicates for causes of action in the event
there is a dispute between the parties. For example, they may form the basis
for an action for fraud or for a defense of misrepresentation because they
are representations upon which persons rely.
72. "[I]n the face of substantial congressional opposition, constitutional-
ism and politics will combine to produce a volatile mixture, one which seri-
ously impairs the president's ability to conduct a consistent, coherent, and
workable foreign policy on behalf of the nation." KRAFr, supra note 55, at
143.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
[Vol. 31:217
PRESDENTIAL CERTIFICATIONS
one, Congress may refuse to cooperate with the President in
matters where such cooperation is essential, such as the pas-
sage of legislation or the confirmation of Presidential appoin-
tees. On a more mundane level, Congress can express its dis-
approval by requiring administration officials to appear before
it to justify certification decisions, a task that is both time-con-
suming and burdensome.
73
Despite these Congressional controls, certification re-
quirements are not particularly effective in controlling execu-
tive behavior. There are at least five factors which make the
requirements porous: 1) ambiguities in drafting; 2) executive
evaluations; 3) the strong temptation to use extra-statutory cri-
teria in making certifications; 4) unwieldy Congressional
methods of overturning certifications; and 5) the difficulty (if
not impossibility) of obtaining judicial review.
7'
1. Drafting
Certification requirements often fail to restrain the execu-
tive because they are broadly drafted, thus making it relatively
easy for an administration to make a colorable argument that
a certification isjustified. The anti-narcotics statute provides a
good example-§ 490 of the Foreign Assistance Act requires
the President to determine which countries are "major illicit
drug producing countries" or "major drug-transit countries"
and to inform Congress of his determination by November 1
of each year.75 The statute requires the United States to im-
73. This is true in other contexts. For example, one means of encourg-
ing a government to comply with its treaty obligations is to require it to ap-
pear before an international body and explain such compliance. See Monica
L. McHam, Comment, AU's Well that Ends WIL- A Pragnatic Look, at Interna-
tional CiminalExtradition, 20 Hous.J. INT'L L 419, 441 n.152 (1998) (citing
Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Enforcing International Lau, ASIL INSIGHT, (Am. Soc'y
Int'l L.) Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 2).
74. Several of these factors are identified and discussed uith respect to
Congressional control over the President in Koh, supra note 10, at 1291-
1318.
75. 22 U.S.C. § 2291j(h) (1994). A "major illicit drug producing coun-
try" is defined as:
(A) a country in which 1,000 hectares or more of illicit opium
poppy is cultivated or harvested during a year;,
(B) 1,000 hectares or more of illicit coca is cultivated or harvested
during a year; or
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pose economic sanctions against such countries, 76 but these
sanctions may be waived if the President makes one of two cer-
tifications. The President may certify that the country in ques-
tion "has cooperated fully with the United States, or has taken
adequate steps on its own, to achieve full compliance with the
United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances."77 Alternatively, he may
certify that "the vital national interests of the United States re-
quire that the assistance withheld... be provided and that the
United States not vote against multilateral development bank
assistance for that country ... 78
The statute requires that the President take into account a
number of factors when deciding whether to certify a country,
which vary with the type of certification being made. When
determining whether a country has cooperated with the
United States, the President is required to:
[C]onsider the extent to which the country has-
(A) met the goals and objectives of the United
Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Sub-
stances, including action on such issues as
illicit cultivation, production, distribution,
sale, transport and financing, and money
laundering, asset seizure, extradition, mu-
(C) 5,000 hectares or more of illicit cannabis is cultivated or har-
vested during a year, unless the President determines that such
illicit cannabis production does not significantly affect the
United States.
22 U.S.C. § 2291(e) (2). A "major drug-transit country" is defined as a coun-
try: "(A) that is a significant direct source of illicit narcotic or psychotropic
drug or other controlled substances significantly affecting the United States;
or (B) through which are transported such drugs or substances; [sic.]." 22
U.S.C. § 2291 (e) (5).
76. The President must withhold 50% of U.S. bilateral assistance to that
country and the United States must oppose assistance from "multilateral
development banks" to the country in question. See 22 U.S.C. § 2291j(a).
"Multilateral development bank" means the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development, the International Development Association, the
Inter-American Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the Afri-
can Development Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment. See id.
77. 22 U.S.C. § 2291 (b) (1) (A).
78. 22 U.S.C. § 2291 (b) (1)(B).
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tual legal assistance, law enforcement and
transit cooperation, precursor chemical
control, and demand reduction;
(B) accomplished the goals described in an ap-
plicable bilateral narcotics agreement ith
the United States or a multilateral agree-
ment; and
(C) taken legal and law enforcement measures
to prevent and punish public corruption, es-
pecially by senior government officials, that
facilitates the production, processing, or
shipment of narcotic and psychotropic
drugs and other controlled substances, or
that discourages the investigation or prose-
cution of such acts.
79
If the President certifies that it is in the national interest
to waive sanctions, the President must include in the certifica-
tion:
(A) a full and complete description of the vital
national interests placed at risk if United
States bilateral assistance to that country is
terminated pursuant to this section and
multilateral development bank assistance is
not provided to such country; and
(B) a statement weighing the risk described
in ...subparagraph (A) against the risks
posed to the vital national interests of the
United States in combating narcotics or to
take adequate steps to combat narcotics on
its owin.80
Even with these guidelines, however, interpreting and im-
plementing the statute is difficult at best. What, for example,
are the "goals and objectives" of the United Nations Conven-
tion Against ilicit Traffic in Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances?8' The Convention itself provides that its goals in-
79. 22 U.S.C. § 2291j(b) (2).
80. 22 U.S.C. § 2291j(b) (3).
81. United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances, opened for signature Dec. 20, 1988, 28 I.LM. 493
(1989).
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clude action on issues such as illicit cultivation, production,
distribution, sale, transport, and financing; money laundering;
asset seizure; extradition; mutual legal assistance; law enlbrce-
ment and transit cooperation; precursor chemical control; and
demand reduction. 2 But how many of these issues does a
country have to address in a given year to qualify for certifica-
tion? All of them? A majority of items? Just one? Ideally, a
country would be expected to take action in all areas, but the
statute does not expressly require this. Further, if a country
has taken "action" on a particular issue-say, for example, by
extraditing a suspect to the United States for prosecution-has
it then met a goal or objective of the Convention, or is some-
thing more required? Add to this uncertainty the fact that a
country need only have "cooperated" with the United States in
taking "adequate steps" "to achieve full compliance" with these
goals and objectives, and it is easy to see how an administration
82. Not surprisingly, these issues coincide roughly with a number of con-
cerns addressed by the Convention. They include the creation of drug-re-
lated offenses (art. 3),jurisdiction over such crimes (art. 4), confiscation of
drug-related materials and funds (art. 5), extradition of persons suspected of
having committed drug-related offenses (art. 6), mutual legal assistance in
law enforcement (art. 7), transfers of criminal proceedings (art. 8), other
forms of cooperation and training (art. 9), cooperation and assistance with
respect to drug-transit states (art. 10), controlled delivery of narcotics (art.
11), the prevention of diversion of controlled substances (art. 12), the use of
materials for the production of drugs (art. 13), crop eradication (art. 14),
commercial carriers (art. 15), the lawvful exportation of drugs (art. 16), illicit
traffic by sea (art. 17), the suppression of criminal activities in free trade
zones (art. 18), and preventing the use of mails for drug trafficking (art. 19).
See id.
Paragraph 1 of the Convention states: "The purpose of this Convention
is to promote cooperation among the Parties so that they may address more
effectively the various aspects of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psycho-
tropic substances having an international dimension." Id. The Convention
requires parties to criminalize certain drug-related activities. It also provides
for international cooperation against drug traffickers. See id.
In the preamble, the parties express their concerns about the increase
in the production, transport, and use of illicit narcotics and psychotropic
substances. Among other things, the parties are "[d]etermined to deprive
persons engaged in illicit traffic of the proceeds of their criminal activities
and thereby eliminate their main incentive for so doing," Id. They also de-
sire "to eliminate the root causes of the problem of abuse of narcotic drugs
and psychotropic substances, including the illicit demand for such drugs
and substances and the enormous profits derived from illicit traffic .... " Id.
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could conclude that, under the law, even a fairly recalcitrant
country may nevertheless qualify for certification.
s
2. Executive Evaluations
Certification requirements are often ineffective in con-
trolling executive action because, by definition, the executive
branch conducts the initial evaluations and fact-finding neces-
sary to make a certification. It is the President who decides
whether a country is cooperating with the United States in
anti-narcotics activities or whether a country has improved its
human rights record. In one respect, this allocation of respon-
sibility simply reflects the comparative advantage that the exec-
utive branch enjoys in gathering relevant information. Certifi-
cation requirements are designed in part for this reason. But
in hard cases, the effect of this division of labor is to make it
relatively easy for the executive branch to provide evidence to
bolster arguments that a certification is correct-particularly if
a statute, out of necessity or otherwise, has been broadly
drafted. Such argumentation in turn shifts the burden of
demonstrating that the certification is incorrect to Congress. "'
83. For example, Administration officials argued in 1997 that the then-
recent arrest of Mexico's drug czar on grounds of corruption, although
shocking, actually highlighted the seriousness with which Mexican officials
were willing to fight corruption. See Mexican and American Responses to the
International Narcotics ThreaL" Hearing Before the Subconm. on he l~Stema Hem-
sphere Peace Corps, Narcotics and Terrorism of the Senate Comm. on loreign Rda-
tions, 105th Cong. 49 (1997) [hereinafter Mexican and American Respnsci
(Statement of Robert S. Gelbard, Assistant Secretary of State) (arguing that
"if the Gutierrez Rebello arrest revealed just how deeply rooted corrption is
in Mexican counter drug institutions, it also showed unprecedented political
courage by President Zedillo, and clearly demonstrated his deep commit-
ment to addressing the high level political corruption that undermines Mex-
ican drug control institutions. This is precisely the kind of progress we are
trying to encourage.").
84. For example, under the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L No. 105-118, 111 Star.
2386, 2399 (1997), no more than $30 million may be made available to the
Korean Peninsula Energy Development Corporation (KEDO), and the funds
may be used only for administrative expenses and heavy fuel oil costs associ-
ated with the Agreed Framework. No such funds may be obligated unless
the President certifies that
(1) (A) the parties to the Agreed Framework are taking steps to as-
sure that progress is made on the implementation of the
January 1, 1992,Joint Declaration on ie Denuclearization
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3. Extra-Statutory Criteria
In difficult cases, the executive branch can be tempted to
use extra-statutory criteria for determining whether a certifica-
tion should be issued 8 5-this is another reason why certifica-
tion requirements are often ineffective. The executive branch
almost always justifies a controversial certification by arguing
that the substantive requirements of the certification have
been met while, at the same time, asserting that other consid-
erations weigh in favor of the certification.
Once again, the 1997 certification of Mexico is a case in
point. Administration officials insisted that the decision to
certify Mexico was based on the standards set forth in the stat-
ute.8 6 When asked at a press conference whether the decision
was influenced by other interests, State Department officials
asserted that the decision was based purely on the require-
ments of the statute87 and on evidence that Mexico had met
of the Korean Peninsula and the implementation of the
North-South dialogue, and (B) North Korea is complying
with the other provisions of the Agreed Framework be-
tween North Korea and the United States and with the
Confidential Minute;
(2) North Korea is cooperating fully in the canning and safe
storage of all spent fuel from its graphite-moderated nu-
clear reactors and that such canning and safe storage is
scheduled to be completed by April 1, 1998; and
(3) North Korea has not significantly diverted assistance pro-
vided by the United States for purposes for which it was not
intended...
Id. at 2400. The President may waive this certification requirement if he
determines that "it is vital to the national security interests of the United
States." Id.
The executive branch, with its control over the intelligence community,
is in the best position to gather the information necessary to make such a
certification. But suppose the President certified that all of the conditions
for assistance were met and Congress disagreed? Of course, Congress can
engage in fact-finding through the hearing process, but Congress would still
have the burden of gathering sufficient evidence that would counter admin-
istration arguments that its certification was justified.
85. See Horton & Sellier, supra note 9, at 858-60.
86. See Madeleine K. Albright & Robert S. Gelbard, Press Briefing: Inter-
national Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1996, Feb. 28, 1997 (visited Oct.
27, 1998) <http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/970228.html>.
87. Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement
Affairs, Robert S. Gelbard, argued that:
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those requirements.8 8 However, statements by other Adminis-
tration officials indicate that additional concerns did influence
the certification decision. At the same press conference, the
Secretary of State reminded the public of the importance of
good relations between Mexico and the United States. 9 The
same point was made more forcefully by Jeffrey Davidow, Assis-
tant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, in testimony
before the House International Relations Committee days af-
ter the certification was issued. 90 Mr. Davidow begani by recit-
ing the improvements in cooperation between the United
The decision was made on the basis of the assessment recom-
mended to the President by the Secretary of State, taking into ac-
count the views of other relevant members of the Cabinet, as in
previous years. The statute is very clear in terms of the scope pro-
vided for the decision, and on that basis it was made on counter-
narcotics criteria and the discussions we have had ith the Mexican
Government over the last year and our \icw, our assessment of their
action.
Id.
Based on this assessment, the Assistant Secretary continued, the Admin-
istration concluded that Mexico had met the requirements of the statute:
The President felt very clearly, as did the Secretary of State, as did I,
in recommending this to the Secretary, that the test of the law is
whether a government is cooperating with us fully, whether they
are in compliance with the 1988 Vienna Convention. We felt that
was a dear-cut decision here.
Id.
88. This included the extradition of drug-traffickers and the increased
seizures of drugs. See id
89. The Secretary of State noted the following.
Let us also remember that our relationship with Mexico is strong
and among the most important we have with any country in the
world. In the last few years, President Clinton has repeatedly stood
by Mexico at difficult moments. He won ratification of NAFTA and
acted decisively during Mexico's economic crisis. These decisions
were not entirely popular, but they were right and they have paid
off for the American people. In the long term, they will pay off
even more.
This is another difficult but correct decision. It is designed to im-
prove the climate for future cooperation, which is the goal of our
policy. I am confident that it will serve the interests of the Ameri-
can people, and the President and I will look to Mexico in the corn-
ing months to help us ensure it does.
90. See An Overview of U.S. Polity in the Western Hemisphere: Hearings Before
the House Comm. on International Relations, 105th Cong. 21 (1997) (statement
ofJeffrey Davidow).
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States and Mexico in counter-narcotics activities. However, he
then turned to other considerations. He argued that the certi-
fication decision must be placed in the larger context of
United States-Mexico relations, 91 that efforts to decertify Mex-
ico would severely impact Mexico's efforts at democratic and
economic reform, 92 and that focusing solely on certification
would undermine President Zedillo's attempts to address
other areas of concern to the United States. 93 Finally, Mr. Da-
vidow warned that "decertification" might have an adverse ef-
fect on the Mexican economy.
94
Comments such as these indicate that in hard cases, bas-
ing a certification decision solely on the criteria set forth in
91. I think it's important that, as the certification decision is de-
bated, we keep the importance of our overall relationship with
Mexico in perspective. Our relations with Mexico are as important
as those with any country in the world. We share a 1,900-mile bor-
der and Mexico is our third-and soon to be second-largest
trading partner. Our economic relations with Mexico have a direct
impact on the lives and livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of
Americans.
Id. at 26.
92. Any effort to overturn the certification decision will have broad
consequences for Mexico, and for us. President Zedillo is leading
his country down a path of political reform toward more democ-
racy and more honest elections. He has sustained a sensible
macroeconomic course despite strong populist pressures to yield in
the face of severe recession.
Id.
93. [President Zedillo] has pushed his bureaucracy toward a more
open and pragmatic relationship with the United States on a variety
of multilateral issues of interest to us, and more frank and construc-
tive exchanges on our toughest non-drug bilateral issues, such as
migration. His stances have not always been popular in Mexico.
To ignore this cooperation and to focus solely on the narcotics issues would
undermine the policies President Zedillo has championed, and play into
the hands of those political forces in Mexico that want to drag the
country backward, not forward.
Id. (emphasis added).
94. Economically, the likely effect of any successful action to over-
turn the President's decision would be higher Mexican interest
rates and lower growth prospects, as the financial markets reacted
to our "distancing" from Mexico. It is difficult to quantify this e-
fect, but there is little doubt about its negative character.
ld. See also Mexican and American Responses, supra note 83, at 4549 (statement
of Lawrence H. Summers, Deputy Director, Department of the Treasury)
(making similar arguments against the "decertification" of Mexico).
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the statute is very difficult. Other considerations, such as eco-
nomic relations and national security, almost invariably inform
the decision.95 In one respect, this impulse is understandable.
As we have seen, certification requirements often appear in
legislation which can have a significant impact on U.S. foreign
policy-legislation which may require the imposition of eco-
nomic sanctions on other countries or which may prevent the
United States from providing military assistance. The execu-
tive branch may sincerely believe it is unwise to impose such
sanctions or to refrain from providing such assistance, de leg-
islation notwithstanding. In such circumstances, it is no sur-
prise that the executive branch might be tempted to "stretch
the facts" to make a requisite certification. 96
4. Unwieldy Congressional Tools
Certifications also fail to stop executive action because of
the difficulty of overturning a certification, short of Congress
enacting new legislation to block the proposed Presidential ac-
tion. Part I of this article showed that some certification re-
quirements are accompanied by provisions allowing Congress
to veto the certifications. However, the Supreme Court deci-
sion in Chadha97 calls into question Congress's ability to over-
turn a Presidential certification by anything short of a joint
resolution. In Chad/ia, the Court struck down a statute en-
95. The case of Mexico is particularly telling because the Foreign Assist-
ance Act, through a "vital interest" provision, provides a means to take those
considerations into account. Yet, the Administration chose not to take that
route.
96. President Clinton is reported to have acknowledged this very point
with regard to "automatic sanctions legislation," legislation which requires
the United States to impose economic sanctions on countries for various
reasons such as human rights, religious persecution, and nuclear prolifcra-
tion. He is quoted as saying.
What always happens if you have automatic sanctions legislation is
it puts enormous pressure on whoever is in the executive branch to
fudge an evaluation of the facts of what is going on. And tat's not
what you want. What you want is to leave the President some flexi-
bility, including the ability to impose sanctions, some flexibility
with a range of appropriate reactions.
Elaine Sciolino, Clinton Argues for "Flexibifly" Over Sanctions, N.Y. T.vms, Apr.
28, 1998, at Al.
97. Immigration and Nationalization Services v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983).
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abling the House of Representatives to overturn, by resolution,
the Attorney General's suspension of a deportation proceed-
ing because it would be violative of the presentment clause.
The Court found that a House resolution veto is essentially leg-
islative in purpose and effect-an action "that had the purpose
and effect of altering the legal rights, duties and relations of
persons,... all outside the legislative branch."98
The joint resolution is the only sure means by which Con-
gress can overturn a Presidential certification after Chadha.
Passed by both Houses and presented to the President for sig-
nature,99 the joint resolution avoids the constitutional
problems raised by a resolution passed by one House only or
by a concurrent resolution. Indeed, several certification stat-
utes provide that Congress has the power to override an execu-
tive certification by joint resolution.'00 However, ajoint reso-
lution by Congress that is capable of surviving a Presidential
veto requires the two-thirds overriding vote of both Houses.
5. Judicial Review
Chadha makes it difficult for Congress to overturn a Presi-
dential certification short of passing new legislation. But what
if an interested party disagrees with a certification and seeks to
overturn it in court? As discussed in Part II, the prospects for
success here are dim because the courts are generally reluctant
to involve themselves in foreign affairs. An array of doc-
trines-ripeness, mootness, standing, political question, and
equitable discretion-bar parties from turning to the courts to
resolve disputes over foreign affairs matters. Although all of
these doctrines likely come into play in litigation involving a
certification requirement, three merit particular attention.
Posing the most significant hurdles to judicial review are the
doctrines of standing, equitable discretion, and political ques-
tion.
98. Id. at 952.
99. See CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 17, at 208 n.1.
100. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 2492(b) (3) (1994) (authorizing Congress to
override by joint resolution a Presidential certification waiving economic
sanctions against drug-producing or drug-transit countries); 22 U.S.C.
§ 2291j(d-e) (1994); 22 U.S.C. § 2799aa(b) (2) (A) (1994) (authorizing Con-
gress to override by joint resolution a Presidential certification allowing eco-
nomic assistance to a country that is engaged in the transfer of nuclear en-
richment materials or technology).




Under Article m of the Constitution, the judicial power
extends to "cases" and "controversies."101 Standing is part of a
constellation of doctrines-including justiciability, ripeness,
and mootness-that the courts have developed in response to
the requirements of the constitutional text and the balance of
powers concerns that underlie it. Unless a court limits itself to
deciding actual cases, it embroils itself in issues that are best
decided by the politically accountable branches of govern-
ment.10 2 The standing doctrine requires that a party have a
personal stake in an actual case or controversy that is
redressable by the court. The doctrine has a complex history;
some would argue that it is in a state of doctrinal disarray.103
It is impossible to anticipate all of the ways in which stand-
ing issues might arise in a challenge to a Presidential certifica-
tion. Yet, it is fair to say that standing poses a significant hur-
dle to judicial review. The difficulty in alleging standing can
be seen by considering a hypothetical lawsuit in which a pri-
vate U.S. citizen, a non-profit organization, and a member of
Congress all challenge a Presidential certification that Country
X is not engaged in a pattern of gross violations of internation-
ally recognized human rights, thereby qualifying Country X to
receive U.S. economic assistance. Under current law, to estab-
lish standing a plaintiff must demonstrate that: "(1) [it has]
suffered an injury that is both 'concrete and particularized'
and 'actual or imminent,' not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical;'
(2) that the injury is fairly traceable to the conduct of which
[it] complain [s]; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by
a court decision in [its] favor."10 4 What are the chances that
101. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, d. 1.
102. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 858 (1997) (citing Allen v. Wright,
468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (stating "the law of Art. III standing is built on a
single basic idea-the idea of separation of powers")).
103. See generally Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794, 798
(D.C. Cir. 1987) ("[T]he lav of standing remains uncertain and unsettled
in some of its major branches."); RobertJ. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Mhe
Separation of Powers: A Neo-federalist Approad, 81 Cojmvu L RE,. 393 (1996)
(discussing the development of modem standing doctrine); Girardeau A.
Spann, Color-Coded Standing 80 Coiu.LL L REV. 1422, 1426-37 (1995).
104. Skaggs v. Carle, 110 F.3d 831, 834 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). See also Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998) (citing three-part
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these plaintiffs would satisfy the requirements of injury, causa-
tion, and redressability?
Injury. Except in rare circumstances, 10 5 it would be ex-
tremely difficult for a private citizen to allege injury resulting
from an invalid certification. A party must allege injury in fact,
with a high degree of particularity-a general interest in gov-
ernmental compliance with the law is not enough to create
standing. 10 6 This means that the U.S. citizen cannot argue
that he or she has been injured simply because the certifica-
tion is illegal. It is hard to imagine how an invalid certification
would injure an individual in any other cognizable way.
Attempts to claim standing based on one's status as a tax-
payer have been largely unsuccessful. As is true with standing
law generally, a taxpayer challenging public expenditures must
allege that she has suffered direct injury as a result of the al-
leged wrong and not merely that she has suffered an indirect
injury common to all taxpayers. 10 7 In Clark v. United States,108
for example, private taxpayers sued the United States for a re-
fund of that portion of their taxes which had been used for
assistance to El Salvador and the Nicaraguan contras. The
plaintiffs argued that the assistance had been given in violation
test); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Lujan v. Na-
tional Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737
(1984); Elizabeth F. Schwartz, Getting Away With Murder: Social Cleansing in
Colombia and the Role of the United States, 27 U. MIAMi INTER-AM. L. REv. 381,
411-15 (1996-97) (discussing standing to sue to enjoin U.S. assistance to Co-
lombia).
105. Such a case might exist if the U.S. citizen had suffered human rights
abuses in Country X. However, as is discussed later in this section, he or she
would still have to satisfy the causation and redressability elements of stand-
ing.
106. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separa-
tion of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 482-83 (1982); Schlesinger v.
Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 217-20 (1974).
107. SeeFrothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). However, a taxpayer
does establish standing to challenge the constitutionality of a Congressional
enactment if he alleges (1) "the unconstitutionality only of exercises of con-
gressional power under the taxing and spending clause of Art. I, § 8, of the
Constitution" and (2) "that the challenged enactment exceeds specific con-
stitutional limitations imposed upon the exercise of the congressional taxing
and spending power and not simply that the enactment is generally beyond
the powers delegated to Congress by Art. I, § 8." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,
102-03 (1968).
108. 609 F. Supp. 1249 (D. Md. 1985).
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of a provision of the Foreign Assistance Act which prohibits
U.S. aid to countries that engage in a consistent pattern of
gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.109
The court dismissed the action, holding in part that under Ar-
ticle Ill plaintiff-taxpayers had to show that they suffered direct
injury as a result of the allegedly illegitimate use of their
funds." 0
An organization might be better situated to allege suffi-
cient injury for purposes of standing. The courts have found
that an organization alleges sufficient injury where its organi-
zational purpose has been thwarted by the alleged wrongdo-
ing.11' Thus, an organization whose purpose is to promote
109. See 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (a) (2) (1994).
110. See Clark, 609 F. Supp. at 1251. Additionally, the court held that the
Foreign Assistance Act did not create standing for a taxpayer or private citi-
zen to sue for its enforcement. The court reasoned: "it is a section clearly
enacted to effect [sic] the relationship between the Congress and the Presi-
dent over disbursing foreign aid funds in light of an official policy of con-
cern for human rights. The only parties with standing to seek adjudication
under section [502B] are the executive and legislative branches." Id.
111. The leading case is Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363
(1982), in which the Supreme Court held that a non-profit corporation had
standing to sue in its own capacity under the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42
U.S.C. § 3604 (1994). The suit alleged that the defendants had engaged in
racial steering in violation of § 804 of the AcL The complaint alleged that
"Plaintiff HOME has been frustrated by defendants' racial steering practices
in its efforts to assist equal access to housing through counseling and other
referral services. Plaintiff HOME has had to devote significant resources to
identify and counteract the defendant's [sic] racially discriminatory steering
practices." Havens, 455 U.S. at 379. The Court concluded that if the defend-
ants' steering practices had frustrated plaintiffs' efforts to provide counsel-
ing and other referral services to moderate and low-income home-seekers,
there was "no question" that the organization had suffered injury in fact.
"Such concrete and demonstrable injury to the organization's activties-
with the consequent drain on the organization's resources-constitutes far
more than simply a setback to the organization's abstract social inter-
ests .... " I&
In Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
Haitian Refugee Center, a non-profit organization, brought suit challenging
the interdiction of Haitian refugees. The court found that the organization
had alleged injury sufficient to satisfy the direct injury test by alleging in its
complaint that its "purpose, as set forth in its by)-ls, [%as] to promote tile
well-being of Haitian refugees through appropriate programs and activities,
including legal representation of Haitian refugees, education regarding
legal and civil rights, orientation, acculturation, and social and referral serv-
ices." The organization further alleged that "the HRC has been directly in-
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human rights in Country X-by engaging in training, lobbying
for human rights, and intervening on behalf of alleged victims
of human rights abuses-could argue that it suffers injury by
being forced to expend resources that would otherwise not
have to be expended to combat human rights violations in that
country.1
12
Members of Congress are held to the same standing re-
quirements as other parties.' 13 Yet here the concerns that un-
derlie the standing doctrine are paramount-courts are partic-
ularly reluctant to enter into disputes between the political
branches.'1 4 The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has
held in a series of decisions that members of Congress have
standing to challenge the legality of executive action, on the
theory that illegal actions impair a legislator's official pow-
ers.115 However, the Supreme Court's recent decision in
jured by the interdiction program in that its organizational purpose has
been thwarted." Id. at 799.
112. As I discuss in the next subsection, however, it may be difficult for
such an organization to demonstrate causation and redressability. See infra
note 123 and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (stating
that "a legislator receives no special consideration in the standing in-
quiry"); Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that a
member of Congress lacked standing to bring suit alleging illegal activities
by the CIA where he failed to allege cognizable injury resulting from such
activities).
114. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 864 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring);
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474 (1982).
115. See Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 28-29 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Moore v. U. S.
House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 950-54 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Riegle v.
Federal Open Market Comm., 656 F.2d 873, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding
that a Senator had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the proce-
dures established by the Federal Reserve Act for the appointment of the five
Reserve Bank members of the Federal Open Market Committee) (dismissed
on other grounds); Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 435-436 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (holding that a senator has standing to bring a suit for declaratory
judgment that an act became law despite the executive's allegation that exec-
utive pocket veto had nullified it); Smith v. Atwood, 845 F. Supp. 911,914-15
(D. D.C. 1994) (holding that a member of Congress would have standing to
challenge the misinterpretation by the administrator of USAID of an amend-
ment to the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Act) (dismissed as
moot). But see Harrington v. Schlesinger, 528 F.2d 455, 459 (4th Cir. 1975);
Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1315 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that a
member of Congress has no standing to challenge constitutionality of Ameri-
can military operations in Vietnam war).
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Raines v. Byrd" 6 calls these lower court decisions into question.
In Raines, the Court held that members of Congress do not
have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Line
Item Veto Act. The plaintiffs had relied heavily on Coleman v.
Miller,"7 a 1939 case which held that Kansas legislators alleged
sufficient injury to obtain standing when-after Kansas legisla-
tors deadlocked in a vote that would have defeated the ratifica-
tion of the "Child Labor" amendment to the U.S. Constitu-
tion-the Lieutenant Governor purportedly broke the Lie by
casting his vote for ratification.' 18 The legislators argued that
their votes had been nullified by the Lieutenant Governor's
action. The Court agreed, finding that the plaintiffs had "a
plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the effec-
tiveness of their votes."" 9
In Raines, the plaintiffs argued that the Line Item Veto
Act similarly diluted their voting power with respect to appro-
priations bills because the Act authorizes the President to can-
cel specific projects listed in such bills.' 20 The Court rejected
the argument, reasoning in part that the "abstract dilution of
institutional power" alleged here did not rise to the level of
vote nullification as in Coleman. It also pointed out that the
plaintiffs were not deprived of adequate remedies in Congress
because they could repeal the Act or exempt specific appropri-
ations from the Act
L2 1
Let us return to our hypothetical legislator. Raines makes
uncertain a legislator's ability to allege injury sufficient for Ar-
tide I standing to challenge a Presidential certification. On
the one hand, Raines may be distinguished in terms of the
harm done to a legislator's voting power. Suppose that our
legislator is one of the majority who voted for the provision
imposing the human rights certification requirement, and that
116. 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
117. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
118. See id, The plaintiffs argued that the Kansas Constitution did not al-
low the lieutenant governor to break deadlocks in this manner. See id. at
436.
119. Id at 438.
120. See Raines, 521 U.S. at 856.
121. See id. at 2320-21. Nor did the court imply that someone with stand-
ing was barred from challenging the constitutionality of the statute. Se id.
The Act was held unconstitutional in Clinton v. City of New York. 118 S. Ct.
2091 (1998).
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the President then issued a certification in a manner that
clearly violated the law. Under these circumstances, the legis-
lator's vote would in effect be nullified by the President's ac-
tion, an injury closer to that suffered by the Kansas legislators
in Coleman than that suffered by the members of Congress in
Raines. On the other hand, it may also be argued that there is
no institutional harm, at least to the extent present in Coleman,
because the legislator, with her colleagues, can always respond
by enacting further legislation that nullifies the President's
acts. 122 That route was not available to the Kansas legislators;
they could not have passed a statute revoking the ratification
of the constitutional amendment.
Causation and Redressability. Even if the parties to our hy-
pothetical lawsuit could allege sufficient injury to satisfy the
standing doctrine, either the individual plaintiff or the organi-
zation would still have great difficulty demonstrating that that
injury is traceable to the invalid certification or that overturn-
ing the certification (thereby halting economic assistance to
Country X) would redress that injury.
Causation and redressability can be difficult to establish
because the injuries complained of are often attributable to a
third party not subject to suit. In Talenti v. Clinton,'23 for ex-
ample, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
held that a private individual did not have standing to compel
the President to withhold federal aid to Italy under the Helms
Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Authorization Act.124
The Helms Amendment prohibits foreign assistance under the
Foreign Assistance Authorization Act, the Foreign Assistance
Act, and the Arms Export Control Act to countries that have
expropriated the property of U.S. persons without adequate
compensation. The plaintiff alleged that the Italian govern-
ment had expropriated his property without adequately com-
pensating him. The appeals court affirmed the district court's
dismissal of the case, reasoning in part that, even in the un-
likely event that the President withheld assistance from It-
122. The flaws in that argument are outlined in my discussion of the equi-
table discretion doctrine. See infra text accompanying note 201.
123. 102 F.3d 573 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
124. 22 U.S.C. § 2370a (g) (1994).
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aly, 125 it was unlikely that such sanctions would force Italy to
compensate the plaintiff.126 The court concluded: "A court is
rightly reluctant to enter a judgment which may have no real
consequence, depending on the putative cost-benefit analyses
of third parties over whom it has no jurisdiction and about
whom it has almost no information."'
2 7
The traceability and redressability requirements would
prove daunting for our hypothetical individual and organiza-
tion. First, the plaintiffs would have to show that their injuries
could be traced to U.S. economic or military assistance to
Country X. The human rights organization would be required
to allege facts which showed that U.S. economic assistance was
at least partially responsible for continued human rights
abuses in Country X, which in turn thw-arted the organiza-
tion's purpose by requiring it to devote more of its resources
125. The Helms Amendment allois the President to waive the sanctions if
he certifies that it is in the national interest to do so. See id.
126. The court said:
In order to find standing, we would have to assume that the Italian
government would respond to the suspension of aid by negotiating
a resolution of Talenti's claim. We have no reason to think a for-
eign government would be so inclined. The suspension of foreign
assistance is a contentious act that may threaten diplomatic rela-
tions and undermine American influence abroad. It seems equally
plausible that a foreign government would find it in the country's
long-term interest to forego American aid to save face....
Talenti v. Clinton, 102 F.3d 573, 578 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
127. Id. (citing Branton v. F.C.C., 993 F.2d 906, 912 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). See
also Smith v. Atvood, 845 F. Supp. 911 (D.D.C. 1994). There, the court held
that two Chinese nationals lacked standing to challenge an interpretation by
the Administrator of USAID of the Kemp Kasten Amendment to Ehe Foreign
Assistance and Related Programs Act, Pub. L. No. 99-88, 99 Stalt. 293 (1985).
The Amendment provided that none of the funds appropriated under the
bill may be used to fund organizations the President has determined "sup-
ports or participates in the management of a program of coerced abortion
or involuntary sterilization." Atwood, 845 F. Supp. at 912. The plaintiffs, to-
gether with a member of Congress, alleged that the head of USAID, to
whom the President had delegated the authority to make the determination,
had illegally failed to determine that the United Nations Fund for Popula-
tion Activities was supporting or participating in a program of coerced abor-
tion or involuntary sterilization in the People's Republic of China. Tie
court acknowledged that the plaintiffs had described "some barbaric ac-
tions" that might befall them should they be forced to return to China, but
found that the relationship of such actions to the law in question ats "too
remote;" therefore, the plaintiffs failed to meet both the Causation and
redressability prongs of the standing test. See id. at 914.
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to combat such abuses. Such links may be very difficult to
draw, even though direct causation need not be demon-
strated. 128 Second, even if a court were to accept that the al-
leged injuries were traceable to such economic assistance, the
court might well conclude that the plaintiff cannot show that
Country X would stop such abuses if the United States were
forced to withhold assistance. 129
A Congressperson, however, who alleges injury by vote
nullification could more easily demonstrate the necessary cau-
sation and redressability. In this case, the nullification would
be readily traceable to the President's illegal certification and
a decision holding the certification invalid would redress that
injury.
b. Equitable Discretion
Members of Congress are likely candidates to challenge a
Presidential certification in the courts. However, the equitable
discretion doctrine could be used to bar such a challenge.
This doctrine holds that the courts will not hear cases brought
by members of Congress where the legislators "could have ob-
tained from Congress the substantial equivalent of the judicial
relief sought... "13O The doctrine addresses the concern that
128. There need not be a direct cause and effect relationship between the
alleged wrong and the injury complained of. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S.
154, 168-69 (1997).
129. Ruling that such sanctions would produce the desired effect would
give the court pause, because the court would enter the realm of crafting
foreign policy:
Given the complexity and interdependence of our society and gov-
ernmental policies, it will often be possible to allege with some
plausibility that a change in a governmental policy is likely to cause
other persons or institutions to modify their behavior in ways bene-
ficial to the plaintiff. If such allegations were routinely accepted as
sufficient to confer standing, courts would be thrust into a far
larger role of judging governmental policies than is presently the
case, or than seems desirable.
Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794, 805 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (citing
Northwest Airlines v. FAA, 795 F.2d 195, 204 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
Of course, one could conceive of a situation in which it is clear that U.S.
assistance is absolutely essential for a third party's actions. In such cases, the
traceability and redressability prongs would be more easily satisfied.
130. Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539, 543 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (citing Carl Mc-
Gowan, Congressmen in Court: The New Plaintiffs, 15 GA. L. Riv. 241, 242
(1981)).
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"in such cases the court is asked to intrude into the internal
functionings of the legislative branch itself."'13 The courts
view the legislator's dispute as primarily one with his or her
colleagues, not with the executive branch.1
32
One of the few cases in which members of Congress chal-
lenged a Presidential certification turned on the equitable dis-
cretion doctrine. In Crockett v. Reagan,133 twenty-nine mem-
bers of Congress sued President Reagan and cabinet members
for providing military assistance to El Salvador in violation of
the War Powers Clause of the Constitution,13 - the War Powers
Resolution, 3 5 and §502B of the Foreign Assistance Act.
136
Section 502B provides, in part, that "no security assistance may
be provided to any country the government of which engages
in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally rec-
ognized human rights."137 Further, §728 of the International
Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981138 condi-
tioned assistance to El Salvador on periodic certifications by
the President that the government of El Salvador was: 1) mak-
ing "a concerted and significant effort to comply with interna-
tionally recognized human rights;" 2) "achieving substantial
control over all elements of its own armed forces so as to bring
131. Id.
132. See MeIcher v. Federal Open Market Commitee, 836 F.2d 561 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (holding that suit challenging constitutionality of method for
choosing members of the Federal Open Market Committee should be dis-
missed on grounds of equitable discretion); Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (affirming dismissal of suit challenging accuracy of the Con-
gressional Record, in part on grounds of equitable discretion); Moore v. U.S.
House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (affirming on
grounds of equitable discretion suit challenging constitutionality of the Tax
Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act); Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (affirming dismissal of Congressmembers' suit challenging the
House committee appointments system); Riegle v. Federal Open Market
Committee, 656 F.2d 873, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (affirming on grounds of
equitable discretion the dismissal of a Senator's suit challenging the consti-
tutionality of the Federal Reserve Act); Carl McGowan, Congretsmen in Court:
The New Plaintiffs, 15 GA. L. REv. 241 (1981).
133. 558 F. Supp. 893 (D. D.C. 1982), aff'd, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir.
1983).
134. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cI. 11.
135. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (1994).
136. 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (1994).
137. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a) (2).
138. Pub. L. No. 97-113, § 728, 95 Stat. 1519 (1981).
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an end to indiscriminate torture and murder of Salvadoran cit-
izens by these forces;" 3) "making continued progress in im-
plementing essential economic and political reforms, includ-
ing the land reform program;" and 4) "committed to the hold-
ing of free elections.'139 President Reagan had issued two such
certifications, but Congress took no action to end assistance to
El Salvador. The plaintiffs, who argued that the certifications
were completely indefensible, asked the court to reexamine
them.1
40
The court refused to do so, holding that the equitable dis-
cretion doctrine constrained it from adjudicating the claim on
the merits. 141 The court stated that: "[W]hen a member of
Congress is a plaintiff in a lawsuit, concern about the separa-
tion of powers counsels judicial restraint even where a private
plaintiff may be entitled to relief."1 42 Where the plaintiffs dis-
pute appears to be primarily with his or her fellow legislators,
the court reasoned, a court no longer mediates between the
two political branches, but rather runs the risk of thwarting
Congress's will by allowing a plaintiff "to circumvent the
processes of democratic decisionmaking."1 43 Here, the court
argued, Congress had addressed the issue of human rights in
El Salvador by imposing certification requirements. The Presi-
dent had issued the required certifications, and Congress as a
whole had not chosen to respond. The court observed:
"Whatever infirmities the President's certifications may or may
not suffer, it is clear under these circumstances plaintiffs' dis-
pute is primarily with their fellow legislators who have author-
ized aid to El Salvador while specifically addressing the human
rights issue, and who have accepted the President's certifica-
tions."144
The court concluded that, while a court might not agree
with the President's assessment of human rights in El Salvador
and thereby find that the President had acted in violation of
the Foreign Assistance Act, "the equitable discretion doctrine
139. Crockett, 558 F. Supp. at 902.
140. See id.
141. See id. With respect to the claims under the Constitution and the War
Powers Resolution, the court found that under the circumstances of this
case, the claims were nonjusticiable political questions. See id. at 901.
142. Id. at 902.
143. Id.
144. Crockett, 558 F. Supp. at 902.
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prevents consideration of these issues on behalf of congres-
sional plaintiffs."145
The equitable discretion doctrine is a unique creature of
the D.C. Circuit and has not been adopted by the Supreme
Court. But suits by members of Congress challenging the pro-
priety of a certification are most likely to be brought in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. If members of
Congress chose to bring an action challenging a Presidential
certification in district court, the equitable discretion doctrine
could pose a significant bar to judicial review. This is particu-
larly true if the legislation imposing the certification require-
ment also contains provisions allowing for a legislative veto by
joint resolution. It would be no surprise if a court concluded
that, in providing for a legislative veto, Congress granted itself
the sole means by which a controversial certification could be
challenged. A court could reasonably conclude that the plain-
tiff legislators simply failed to persuade their colleagues to pass
the joint resolution and, hence, deny review.
c. Political Question Doctrine
The political question doctrine is "a judicial policy declh'r-
ing that certain cases, or questions in cases, that are ithin the
constitutional and statutory jurisdiction of the federal courts
and that otherwise meet all the requirements and indicia for
adjudication are nonetheless nonjusticiable."1 46 The courts are
reluctant to intervene in matters that are better left for resolu-
tion by the political branches.
1 4 7
145. Id. at 903. For a critical discussion of the equitable discretion doc-
trine, see Sophia C. Goodman, Note, Equitable Discretion to Dismiss Congres-
sional-Plaintiff Suits: A Reassessment, 40 CASE W. REs. L REv. 1075 (1990).
146. HrFuixN, supra note 55, at 81. The political question doctrine has
been the subject of much criticism. See ag., Nancy-Ann E. Minn, Toward
More Intelligent National Securiiy Policy Making. The Case for Reform of Arms Con-
trol Impact Statements, 54 GEO. WASH. L. RE,. 174 (1986) (discussing how fle
political question doctrine should not be used to barjudicial review of anns
control impact statements).
147. SeeJapan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc., 478 U.S. 221, 230
(1986) ("The political question doctrine excludes from judicial review those
controversies which revolve around policy choices and value determinations
constitutionally committed for resolution to the halls of Congress or the con-
fines of the Executive Branch.").
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The conditions under which the doctrine applies were set
out in Baker v. Carr1
48
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve
a political question is found a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordi-
nate political department; or a lack of judicially dis-
coverable and manageable standards for resolving it;
or the impossibility of deciding without an initial pol-
icy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertak-
ing independent resolution without expressing lack
of the respect due coordinate branches of govern-
ment; or an unusual need for unquestioning adher-
ence to a political decision already made; or the po-
tentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pro-
nouncements by various departments on one
question.
149
The doctrine does not preclude a court from ever hearing
a case dealing with foreign matters; the court in Carr stated
that "it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which
touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance."'
150
However, the lower courts often use the doctrine to bar suit in
cases involving foreign policy and national security issues.1"' If
148. 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
149. Id. at 217.
150. Id. at 211.
151. See, e.g., Aktepe v. United States, 105 F.3d 1400 (11th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 685 (1998) (holding that the political question doctrine
barred the court from hearing an action brought by Turkish navy sailors for
death and personal injury suffered when two missiles fired by U.S.S. Saratoga
struck a Turkish vessel during NATO exercises); Hoang v. United States, 14
F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 1994). In Hoang, the court found that the political ques-
tion doctrine barred an action by citizens of South Vietnam who claimed
tide to assets of the Republic of South Vietnam that had been frozen by the
United States after the fall of South Vietnam. The court reasoned that adju-
dicating the issue would require a determination of the proper successor to
South Vietnam and would interfere with the President's ability to use the
assets in negotiations with the Vietnamese government. Hoang, 14 F.3d at
163. See also Greenham Women Against Cruise Missiles v. Reagan, 591 F.
Supp. 1332 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 755 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that
the political question doctrine bars challenge to the deployment of cruise
missiles in the United Kingdom); Flynn v. Shultz, 748 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir.
1984). There, the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of
Secretary of State George Shultz. Plaintiffs sought to compel the Secretary
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a Presidential certification entails certain political judgments,
it is unlikely that a court will be willing to entertain a chal-
lenge. 1
52
So far, this article has demonstrated that several factors
combine to make certification requirements a relatively weak
(although not completely ineffective) means of controlling ex-
ecutive behavior: poor drafting, the lack of effective legislative
means to overturn certifications, executive fact-finding, the
temptation on the part of the executive to apply extra-statutoiy
criteria, and the reluctance of the courts to intervene in for-
eign affairs matters. As is discussed below, it is this weakness
which is partly to blame for the frustration many feel about
presidential certifications. However, before beginning that
discussion, it is useful to examine the other functions of certifi-
cation requirements.
B. Influencing the Behavior of Foreign States
Supporters of certification requirements argue that they
serve as a means, however imperfect, of influencing the behav-
ior of foreign states.' 53 This perspective raises at least three
questions with respect to evaluating such requirements: 1) To
what extent is the end sought by certification requirements
(i.e., the influencing of state behavior) valid under interna-
tional law?; 2) If the end is valid, to what extent should certifi-
cation requirements, as a means to that end, be permitted?;
and 3) How effective are certification requirements in secur-
ing that end?
to authorize the testimony of a State Department consular official and to
take other actions allegedly mandated by 22 U.S.C. § 1732. In Cranston v.
Reagan, 611 F. Supp. 247 (D.D.C. 1985), the court dismissed on political
question grounds an action against the administration alleging that separate
agreements between the United States and Sweden and Noramy were in vio-
lation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act because the agreements con-
tained advance consent provisions to the transfer of spent nuclear fuel, alleg-
edly violating the statutory requirement that consideration of such transfers
be made on a case-b)-case basis.
152. However, as I discuss in Part IV, the political question doctrine
should not bar review of every kind of certification.
153. I use the terms "states" and "countries" interchangeably.
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1. Certification Requirements and International Law
Certification requirements have been criticized by com-
mentators both within the United States and abroad, who ar-
gue that certification processes violate international legal
norms. The latest round of criticism stems from the contro-
versy over the annual narcotics certification process. In a let-
ter to The New York Times, the Consul General of Mexico stated
that: "Mexico does not recognize any legitimacy in the process
of certification which goes against international law and the
spirit of cooperation between our countries." 154 He criticized
the process as an "interventionist practice in the internal af-
fairs of States." 155 The Mexican Congress echoed this criti-
cism: "We reaffirm our condemnation against any certification
process because it is a unilateral action that breaks interna-
tional order violently and aims to undermine our self-determi-
nation and sovereign responsibility to fight drug traffick-
ing."15 6 Mexico is not alone in its criticism of these require-
ments.157
154. Letter from Jorge Pinto, Consul General of Mexico, to the Editor of
The New York Times (Feb. 18, 1996). The letter appears not to have been
published in the Times, but portions of the letter were released to the new-
swires by the Mexican government. See, e.g., Larry Lufner, Columbians bitter
over decertification, WASH. TiMES, May 7, 1996, at A10 (quoting the relevant
language). A Spanish version of the Mexican government's press release
containing excerpts from the letter is available on the internet at http://
www.quicklink. com/mexico/gob96feb/bo137.htm.
155. Id.
156. Congress Unanimously Condemns U.S. Certification Process, BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts, Feb. 28, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, News
Sources Directory, BBC Summary of World Broadcast File.
157. For example, the acting Foreign Minister of Ecuador disagreed with
"the view that a state has the authority to certify or not the activities of an-
other state of the international community." Acting Foreign Minister Questions
USA's Drug Certification Process, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Mar. 6,
1997, available in LEXIS, News Library, News Sources Directory, BBC Sum-
mary of World Broadcast File. "Certification," he said, "should not be a right
to be conferred on anyone." Ecuador is "prepared to join any initiative
aimed at stressing the need for this policy to cease, because these are matters
that fall exclusively within the sovereign purview of every state." Id. The
acting Minister argued that Ecuador had been doing its part to control drug
trafficking, but said, "we do not want to authorize any state to certify the
behavior of others." Id. See also Assembly Special Session on Countering World
Drug Problem Together Concludes at Headquarters, M2 Presswire, June 11, 1998,
available in LEXIS, News Library, News Sources Directory, M2 Presswire File
(discussing the fact that several speakers at a special session of the U.N. Gen-
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The attack has at least two prongs, the first of which is
specific to drug enforcement, but also applies to other areas.
Like Mexico, some criticize the United States's unilateral ac-
tions with regard to certain states, arguing that the Intema-
tional Narcotics Control Board "is the only organ in charge of
international control and evaluation."' 5  According to those
critics, certain areas of international concern, such as narcot-
ics, are subject only to multilateral supervision and control;
unilateral acts, such as an annual anti-narcotics certification
process, violate international law.
This argument has some merit, for in some instances the
United States may be prevented under international law from
acting unilaterally vis-d-vis another country. 15 9 However, it is
difficult to assess the merits of the argument as it applies to
certification requirements, both those specific to anti-narcotics
concerns and those which apply to other areas. As has been
shown, certification requirements appear in legislation that
addresses many issues: narcotics, terrorism, nuclear prolifera-
tion, arms control, human rights, trade, etc. International law
also addresses these areas of concern. A complete evaluation
of this argument requires determining whether the various
eral Assembly argue that "Using certification procedures counters tie con-
cepts of cooperation, multilateralism and respect for the sovereignty and in-
dependence of States").
158. Assembly Special Session on Countering World Dnig Problem Togwher (on-
cludes at Headquarters, supra note 155. See also OAS, Rio Group. lenmurla, Co-
lombia Reject US Certification Process, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. Feb.
23, 1998, available in LEXIS, News Library, News Sources Directory, BBC
Summary of World Broadcast File (reporting that the Organization of Amer-
ican States (OAS), the Rio Group, Venezuela, and Colombia have criticized
the U.S. anti-narcotics certification process, in part because of its unilateral
nature).
159. For example, there are strong arguments that under the terms of
Article XXIII of the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the World Trade
Organization, the United States is precluded under the agreement from tak-
ing unilateral action against a country that it believes is violating die GATT.
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes, Apr. 15, 1994, Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round
of Multinational Trade Negotiations, Annex 2, app. 1, art. XXIII, Liu. I.N-
STRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGLTAY ROUND, 33 I.LM. 1244 (1994). See
also C. O'Neil Taylor, Thw Limits of Economic Power Seation 301 and the Worl
Trade Organization Dispute Settlement System, 30 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 209,
270-72 (1997) (arguing that unilateral action by the United States in this
instance would violate the Understanding).
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sources of international law (treaties, custom, etc.) covering
these matters create a system which prohibits unilateral action
thereunder, an undertaking I do not attempt here.
The second prong of the attack on the requirements is
somewhat more far-reaching, in that it applies to all certifica-
tion requirements. It is argued that certification requirements
violate a fundamental principle of international law: the tenet
that a state has the right to conduct its own internal affairs free
from outside interference. Can it be argued persuasively that
certification requirements violate this principle of indepen-
dence?
160
Certification requirements, whether or not they are part
of a periodic certification process, are designed in part to in-
fluence state behavior. The requirements act as carrot and
stick. If a country fails to meet the criteria set forth in a certifi-
cation requirement, significant consequences may result.
Often, the country will not qualify for economic assistance
from the United States or it will be subject to economic sanc-
tions. One must concede that the matters addressed by certifi-
cation requirements do intrude into a country's internal af-
fairs. For example, legislation that requires the withdrawal of
economic assistance from Russia unless the President certifies
that the Russian government is not discriminating against reli-
gious groups 6 1 clearly touches on matters that, until relatively
recently, were thought to be exclusively domestic in scope.
But even if used in this manner, do certification requirements
and the legislation imposing them violate international law?
160. Before proceeding further, it may be useful to raise and dismiss an-
other potential issue. Certifications often require the executive branch to
make judgments about a state. A state, for example, is certified as systemati-
cally violating human rights or as a major drug-producing country. A state
may quite naturally be offended by such characterizations. Making judg-
ments about states may or may not be wise diplomacy, and may even insult
the country in question, but it is far from clear whether such characteriza-
tions alone violate international law by threatening that state's sovereignty or
autonomy, at least as those concepts are currently understood. States make
judgments about other states all the time. One country agrees to cooperate
with another in security matters based on a judgment that the country in
question is reliable. The European Community determines that another
state may become a member based on judgments about that state's econ-
omy. The Council of Europe decides to admit a member after determining
that it meets certain human rights criteria.
161. See supra note 40.
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Here, one enters a much broader debate concerning the
validity of coercion, particularly economic coercion, under in-
ternational law, a topic well beyond the reach of this article.' 
-
But since so many certifications appear in connection with
economic assistance and economic sanctions, the issues %%-ar-
rant some discussion.
As a preliminary matter, economic assistance is generally
thought of as being purely voluntary. If extending aid is volun-
tary, it would seem to follow that the withdrawal of assistance
also is at the sole discretion of the donor country.163 Indeed,
one might be wary of creating a rule of international law in
162. A number of scholars have examined this issue. Se, e.g., EcoNomttc
COERCION AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL EcoNoMIc ORDER (Richard B. Lil-
lich ed., 1976) [hereinafter ECONOMIC COERCION]; Domingo E. Acevedo, The
U.S. Measures Against Argentina Resulting from the Malvinas Conflid, 78 Am. J.
INT'L L. 323 (1984); Lori Fisler Damrosch, Politits Across Borders: Nonintenen-
tion and Nonforcible Influence Over Domestic Affairs, 83 Am. J. INr'L L 1 (1989);
TomJ. Farer, Political and Economic Coercion in Contemporary Internalional Lau,
79 Am.J. INT'L L. 405 (1985); Shane M. McGee. ... Or I'll Take My Tons and
Go Home: The Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, 20 Hous. J. INr,'r L I 11
(1997); Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, Destination Embargo of Arab Oil: Its Legality under
International Law, 68 AM.J. IN'r'L L. 591 (1974); Patricia Stirling, The Use of
Trade Sanctions as an Enforcement Mechanism for Basic Human Rights: A Proposal
for Addition to the World Trade Organization, 11 Am. U. J. Ir''L L & POL'Y 1
(1996).
163. See TomJ. Farer, Political and Economic Coerdon in Contemporay Intema-
tional Law, 79 Am.J. INT'L L. 405 (1985) (arguing that there is no legal obli-
gation to give economic aid or to continue giving such aid, no matter how
much dependence such aid has caused). But might state A be estopped
from withdrawing assistance in part because promises of further assistance
made by state A to state B have induced state B to rely on such assurance?
Estoppel is recognized as a general principle of international law, and is mo-
tivated by concepts of good faith and reliance. See L% BROW-NUE, PRINcIPLES
OF PUBLIC INTERNA-roNAL LA-W 638 (3rd ed. 1979). Under international
law, the elements for estoppel are: 1) a clear and unambiguous statement; 2)
the statement must be voluntary, unconditional, and authorized; and 3) reli-
ance in good faith upon the statement either to the detriment of the party so
relying on the statement or to the advantage of the party making the state-
ment. In theory, a state, by virtue of an unconditional, unilateral promise to
provide economic assistance to another state which causes that state to rely,
may be bound to that promise or statement. But it is unlikely that a state
would make such promises. See i&. But see Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974
I.C.J. 253 (Dec. 20) (holding that the French statement that it would soon
stop nuclear testing in the atmosphere ivas legally binding). Se also Geoffrey
R. Watson, TheDeath of Treaty, 55 OHIo ST. LJ. 781 (1994) (discussing the
development in international law of analogs to promissory estoppel).
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which assistance is obligatory, outside an agreement to the
contrary. Such a rule could deter states from providing any
assistance out of fear that they would be obliged to continue
such assistance. Yet, realistically, the withdrawal of assistance,
and sometimes the threat of withdrawal, produces real effects
on a country and is often intended to do so."
There is considerable scholarly debate over whether eco-
nomic coercion is permissible under international law. 16 Arti-
cle 2(1) of the U.N. Charter provides that: "The Organization
is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its
Members."' 66 The vision is of "a community consisting pri-
marily of states having a uniform legal personality."167 A corol-
lary of the principle of equality is the principle of non-inter-
vention-the preservation of the value Louis Henkin coins
"state impermeability," namely that "[t]he law requires other
states and the international system to relate to the state as a
whole, as a monolith. Except as the state has agreed other-
wise, other states may not penetrate its territory, its society, its
political-legal system." 168
164. Phil Davison, for example, notes that the United States's "decertifica-
tion" of Colombia for narcotics reasons resulted in a delay of U.S. aid to the
country and made it difficult for Colombia to attract loans. Phil Davison, US
Sets Mexico and Colombia a Tough Drugs Test, INDEP., Feb. 28, 1997, at 12.
Davison also reports that the United States was contemplating additional
sanctions, such as refusing landing rights to Colombian aircraft, rescinding
preferential tariffs, and submitting Colombian citizens traveling to the
United States to onerous searches. See id. All of these efforts were calculated
to force Colombia to take stronger measures against narcotics trafficking.
See id.
165. Economic coercion can, of course, take several forms. It includes
(roughly in order of increasing severity): the denial of economic assistance,
the withdrawal of assistance, unilateral trade embargoes, attempts to cause
international organizations (such as the IMF) to deny economic benefits,
multilateral trade embargoes, and blockades. In this section, I focus primar-
ily on the denial and withdrawal of economic assistance.
166. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
167. BROWNLIE, supra note 163, at 287.
168. Louis HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 101 (1995).
See also Damrosch, supra note 162, at 1-12 (discussing the textual evidence
for a customary norm of nonintervention in internal affairs).
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The Charter therefore protects Members from interven-
tion by the United Nations in "matters which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any State. ... "169
At the same time, the principle of non-intervention em-
bodied in the Charter is not absolute. For example, if there is
a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or an act of aggres-
sion, the Security Council may authorize the use of measures,
including "complete or partial interruption of economic rela-
tions," to maintain or restore international security. 70 But
what if there is no breach of the peace and a state imposes
unilateral economic sanctions? Developing countries tradi-
tionally argue that Article 2 (4) of the Charter, which prevents
states from threatening or using force against the territorial
integrity or the political independence of other states,' 7 ' also
prevents the use of economic coercion. But other states, usu-
ally developed ones, counter that Article 2(4)-subject to the
right of self-defense preserved in Article 51-prohibits only
the use of armed force and does not preclude the threat or use
of other types of coercion in foreign affairs.' 72
169. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7. Provisions of the Charter of the Organi-
zation of American States are even more express. Charter of the Organiza-
tion of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 3. Article
15 provides that: "No State or group of States has the right to intervene,
directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external
affairs of any other State." 2 U.S.T. at 2419, 119 U.N.T.S. at 56. This prohi-
bition purports to forbid not only armed intervention "but also any other
form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State
or against its political, economic, and cultural elements." 2 U.S.T. at 2420,
119 U.N.T.S. at 56. Further, Article 16 provides: "No State may use or en-
courage the use of coercive measures of an economic or political character
in order to force the sovereign will of another State and obtain from it ad-
vantages of any kind." 2 U.S.T. at 2420, 119 U.N.T.S. at 56.
170. U.N. CHAm arts. 39 and 41.
171. Article 2(4) of the Charter provides that member states -shall refrain
in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state .... " Id. art. 2(4).
172. SeeAcevedo, supra note 162, at 323 (arguing that under some circum-
stances, the imposition of economic sanctions by a state may cross the
bounds of permissible behavior under international law); Lee C. Buchheit,
The Use of Nonviolent Coercion: A Study in Legality under Article 2(4) of the Charter
of the United Nations, in ECONOMIC COERCION, supra note 162, at 51-2 (discuss-
ing debate among developing and developed countries about the scope of
Article 2(4)); Richard B. Lillich, Economic Coercion and the International Legal
Order, in ECONOMIC COERCION, supra note 162, at 76 (same).
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Customary international law also establishes the principle
of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states. But, in
practice, states often use the threat or use of economic coer-
cion in their foreign policy. Lori Damrosch points out that
states commonly provide economic benefits to other states on
certain conditions, which indicates that this practice, with the
aim of encouraging certain behavior, is "legitimate."'173 The
issue becomes much more difficult when a state withdraws ben-
efits or threatens to do so. Yet, even here, states often use eco-
nomic sanctions to influence domestic matters such as
changes in government. Again, some countries have invoked
international norms, including nonintervention, in opposing
such sanctions. However, other countries reject such argu-
ments, negating any assertion that there is a generally-ac-
cepted customary norm with respect to sanctions. 174 The fact
that both sanctioning and sanctioned states are able to garner
support for their respective positions indicates that there is no
international consensus on this matter.
75
The International Court ofJustice touched briefly on this
issue in the Nicaragua case. 176 Nicaragua asserted that the
United States, through economic sanctions, had engaged in
an unlawful, indirect intervention in Nicaragua's internal af-
fairs. U.S. economic assistance had been halted, resulting in a
90% reduction in Nicaragua's sugar quota and the imposition
of a trade embargo. Nicaragua admitted in principle that
some of the actions, in and of themselves, were permitted
under international law but argued that, taken together, they
constituted "a systematic violation of the principle of non-in-
tervention." 177 The court rejected this argument. Although
acknowledging that certain economic sanctions might in prin-
ciple constitute violations of specific treaties, such as the GATT
(an issue that the court found to be outside its jurisdiction),
the court was "unable to regard such [economic sanctions] as
a breach of the customary-law principle of non-interven-
tion."178
173. Damrosch, supra note 162, at 30.
174. See id. at 32.
175. See id. at 33-34.
176. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.G.J. 14,
115-16 (June 27).
177. Id. at 126.
178. Id.




Even if one concludes that certification requirements are
not prohibited by international law, the question still remains
whether such requirements are effective in influencing the be-
havior of states. Of course, effectiveness will depend on the
consequences that follow if a state fails to satisfy the criteria set
out in a certification requirement (i.e., the effect that the
threat or realization of such consequences has on state behav-
ior). Certification requirements figure in a number of differ-
ent kinds of actions that have direct effects on a foreign state.
Discussion of the effectiveness of the threat or imposition of
economic sanctions is warranted because so many certification
requirements are tied to such sanctions.
Even those who support the use of economic sanctions to
achieve foreign policy goals concede that it is extremely diffi-
cult to assess the effectiveness of the threat or use of economic
sanctions in influencing state behavior. For one thing, it is ex-
tremely difficult, if not impossible, to draw a direct causal link
between threatened or imposed sanctions and a desired policy
goal. 7 9 A state may act for any number of reasons, only one of
which may be to avoid sanctions. A second related point is
that it is not easy to define the precise goal of such sanctions.
Were economic sanctions imposed on South Africa to cause
the South African government to end apartheid? To create
conditions that prodded the South African government in that
direction? Merely to express U.S. condemnation of such op-
pression? Or were they imposed for all of these reasons? Ob-
viously, the success or failure of sanctions depends on which
goal one chooses to name.8 0
Despite these problems, several commentators argue that
the threat or use of economic sanctions has had some measure
179. See, e.g., "The Gulf War: The Law of International Sanctions," Pro-
ceedings of the 85th Annual Meeting of the American Society of Interna-
tional Law 172 (1991) (remarks of Kimberly Ann Elliot) (assessing the effec-
tiveness of economic sanctions is more ajudgment than a science); -Effects
and Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions," Proceedings of the 84th Annual
Meeting of the American Society of International Law 206-207 (1990) (re-
marks of Michael P. Malloy) (tracing the effectiveness of sanctions in any
causal sense is not easy).
180. Eliot, supra note 179, at 172.
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of success.18 1 In 1987, Barry Carter pointed to studies indicat-
ing that economic sanctions successfully helped the United
States topple Haiti's Duvalier, Uganda's Idi Amin, Chile's Al-
lende, and the Dominican Republic's Trujillo.' s 2 In 1991, the
Institute for International Economics examined 116 cases in
which sanctions were threatened or imposed and found that in
34% of the cases, sanctions "made [at least] a modest contri-
bution to the goal sought by the [sanctioning] country and
that the goal was in part realized."18 3 However, speaking for
the Institute, Kimberly Elliot was quick to point out that the
effectiveness of such sanctions had decreased markedly since
the 1970s, due in large part to the relative decline of the
United States's influence in the world economy."'
Supporters of the certification process make similar argu-
ments: certifications are a blunt tool, but are useful in per-
suading states to act in ways consistent with U.S. interests.18 5
For example, in support of the annual anti-narcotics certifica-
tion process, ajoint committee of the House and Senate wrote
that certifications served in part to emphasize to foreign gov-
ernments that the United States is serious about narcotics con-
trol: "In testimony before the Congress in recent years, execu-
tive branch officials have repeatedly stated that the certifica-
tion process, while flawed in their judgment, has succeeded in
highlighting to foreign governments the seriousness which the
181. See G. HUFBAUER & J. SCHOTT, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED:
HISTORY AND CURRENT POLICY (2d ed. 1990).
182. Carter, supra note 9, at 1163.
183. Elliot, supra note 179, at 172. The study also concluded that "cases
involving modest goals-such as human rights, nuclear non-proliferation,
discouraging support of terrorism, the release of political prisoners-.
succeeded about a third of the time." Id.
184. See id.
185. See, e.g., U.S. Annual Drug Certification: Hearings Before the House Comm.
on International Relations, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement ofJohn P. Walters,
Former Acting Director and Deputy Director of Supply Reduction, Office of
National Drug Control Policy) (arguing that "[c]ommon sense reveals that
certification works: at an absolute minimum, nations routinely take actions
seeking to avoid 'decertification' that it is difficult to believe would have
taken place without this process") available in LEXIS, Legis Library,
CNGTST file; Mexican and American Responses, supra note 83, at 54 (statement
of Robert S. Gelbard, Assistant Secretary of State) (arguing that "President
Clinton has .. used certification as a powerful and effective tool to exact
greater narcotics control performance abroad").
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U.S. Government attaches to the issues of narcotics con-
trol."18 6
Since most supporters concede that economic sanctions
are an imperfect means of achieving a country's foreign policy
goals, the most telling criticism of sanctions is not that they are
ineffective,187 but that their costs outweigh their benefits.
Whether this is a valid criticism depends on a number of fac-
tors. For example, if the United States is unable to garner
multilateral support for economic sanctions, their effective-
ness is likely to be minimal while the cost to U.S. business will
be high. Moreover, if the United States is inconsistent in im-
posing sanctions, this may also be counterproductive. Riordan
Roett argues, in connection with the anti-narcotics process,
that certifications are not effective in fighting narcotics, not
only because they antagonize friendly nations, but also be-
cause drug traffickers can circumvent the process by operating
in countries that the United States cannot afford to "decer-
tify."188 The question then becomes whether it is worth antag-
onizing other nations if the benefits to the United States are
small.
C. Encouraging Debate
Although certification requirements are relatively unsuc-
cessful at controlling executive behavior and only moderately
effective in influencing the behavior of states, they perform
the additional function of encouraging and focusing debate
on particular foreign policy issues.' 8 9 The debate occurs on at
186. International Cooperation Act Of 1991, H.R. REPj,. No. 225 (Part B)
(1991) [hereinafter Conference Report]. See also US and Mexican Counter-
drug Efforts Since Certification: Cooperation on Drug Control: Hearings Before Senate
Caucus on International Narcotics Control and the Senate Foreign Relations Comm.,
105th Cong. 2 (1997) (statement of Senator Charles E. Grassley) (stating
that certification is "a tool the State Department makes clear is not only
working but is critical in ensuring continued cooperation").
187. After all, it is unrealistic to expect any foreign policy tool to be com-
pletely effective in achieving U.S. foreign policy goals.
188. Open Session on the Western Hemisphere Today: A Roundlable Discusswn:
Hearing Before the Subcommn. on the Western Hemisphere of the House Comm. vn
International Relations, 105th Cong. 61 (1997) (statement of Riordan Roett).
189. See, e.g., Conference Report, supra note 186 ("The committee of con-
ference firmly believes that certification serves a useful purpose in focusing
attention on narcotics issues, both ithin the Congress and the executive
branch."); Horton & Sellier, supra note 9, at 859 ("Bv forcing a foreign pol-
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least two levels. The first centers on whether the particular
criteria of a certification have been met. Thus, there is contro-
versy as to whether Mexico has indeed cooperated with the
United States in achieving anti-narcotics goals. There is dis-
pute as to whether China is preventing the proliferation of nu-
clear weapons technology. But certification requirements also
give rise to a broader discussion-that is, to what extent
should concerns such as anti-narcotics, proliferation, and
human rights, all of which are embodied in certification re-
quirements, influence U.S. foreign policy? Thus, the debate
about Mexico has involved not only arguments about whether
Mexico meets the criteria set forth in the statute, but also
whether U.S. concerns about illicit narcotics merit jeopardiz-
ing relations with a neighboring country. Intense debate en-
sued over U.S. drug enforcement strategy, both prior to and
after the certification of Mexico, as did debate over the role
human rights should play in foreign policy following the certi-
fications of El Salvador in the 1980s and Peru in the early
1990s. 190
D. Defusing Confrontations
Certification requirements do more than encourage de-
bate. They also serve as a safety valve, which helps the legisla-
tive and executive branches avoid direct confrontations over
foreign policy matters. In a world in which the lines of respon-
sibility between the two political branches are blurred, certifi-
cation requirements represent a compromise. Congress is al-
lowed to exert its authority in foreign affairs by imposing the
requirements, but their flexibility gives the President wide dis-
cretion to act. As discussed earlier, the fact is that most certifi-
cations are made without significant opposition from Congress
or the public.
Certification requirements also dampen, or at least divert,
conflict even where a certification is controversial. In such
times, the debate is most often framed in terms of whether the
certification is accurate or justified. As long as the executive
branch can justify issuing a certification, it can claim that it was
icy issue to the forefront of a busy political agenda [through the certification
process], Congress has indeed made it impossible for the El Salvador issue to
fade from public and congressional consciousness ..
190. See supra text accompanying notes 47-53.
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acting under color of law. Compare a controversy framed in
these terms with one that would arise if the President took an
action that was expressly prohibited by Congress. There, the
issues become more ominous-one is forced to decide
whether Congress had the right to prohibit the President from
acting and, if so, what must be done in response to the Presi-
dent's failure to obey the will of Congress. These are matters
that no one wants to confront unless absolutely necessary-
certification requirements make it easier to avoid them, or at
least to pretend that they can be avoided.
E. Allocating Decision-Making and Risk
Certification requirements also allow Congress to shift the
burden and responsibility for difficult foreign policy decisions
to the President. On the one hand, this shift may be perfectly
appropriate. To the extent that there are legitimate reasons
for allowing the President to lead in foreign affairs, the bur-
dens and risks associated with setting foreign policy are prop-
erly placed on the President's shoulders. Statutes that prevent
the President from acting unless he first certifies that national
interests are at stake or that other conditions have been met
may be a Congressional acknowledgment that the President
has a comparative advantage in making those kinds of deci-
sions.
On the other hand, more than one observer notes that
Congress is often reluctant to take strong stands on foreign
affairs issues. Harold Koh writes:
Congress could regularly block executive decisions by
joint resolution or appropriations cutoff, so long as it
could override a presidential veto by a two-thirds
vote. Why hasn't Congress done this regularly? In
many cases, a critical mass of Members has simply
been unvilling to take responsibility for setting for-
eign policy, preferring to leave the decision-and the
blame-Ith the President. 9
1
191. Koh, supra note 10, at 1304. See a/soJames D. Humphrey II, Note,
Foreign Affairs Powers and "The First Crisis of the 21st enturiuy:" Congressional vs.
Executive Authoity and the Stabilization Planfor Mexico, 17 Mict.J. Ir'L L 181,
195-96 (1995) (discussing Congressional and executive responses to the
Mexican peso crisis).
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Certification requirements shift decision-making and
blame to the President, while allowing Congress to take the
moral high ground on foreign policy issues. 192 No one wants
foreign countries to use U.S. assistance to develop weapons of
mass destruction, and no one wants to support a government
that engages in human rights abuses or that permits the pro-
duction or distribution of illicit narcotics. Congress passes leg-
islation which purports to stop the United States from provid-
ing such assistance. However, like all countries, the United
States constantly weighs competing interests when it formu-
lates foreign policy-a very difficult, and often distasteful, task.
Allowing the President to waive such restrictions if he certifies
that it is in the national interest to do so gives him a way to
circumvent such legislation, but the waiver also forces him to
make the hard choices that are part and parcel of policy for-
mation-choices that Congress is often reluctant to make.
This is also true with more factual certifications. Congress can
argue that it is taking tough stands in foreign affairs by requir-
ing the President to certify that strict statutory criteria have
been met before acting. Such legislation places the onus on
the President, who must make the difficult call whether, for
example, a potential recipient of U.S. assistance does not en-
gage in human rights abuses, or whether a country is cooperat-
ing with the United States in its war against drugs. If the Presi-
dent is wrong, he has no one to blame but himself and his
staff. 193
192. "[T]he certification process allows Congress to appear to be exercis-
ing some oversight of the President, while in fact the ultimate decision about
continued aid is left to the President's discretion." Horton & Sellier, Supra
note 9, at 858.
193. Similar reasons have been given to explain the delegation of Con-
gressional powers to administrative agencies:
There are severe political costs to precise solutions of problems; no
such costs attach if Congress merely identifies a problem and asks
administrators to solve it. If the administrators fail, members of
Congress may blame them. A broad delegation of authority thus
allows Congress to claim the credit for identification of a problem
while insulating it from attack if particular solutions exacerbate
that problem.
STONE ET AL., supra note 54, at 415-16.
It should be observed, however, that in theory, certification require-
ments might also serve to shift responsibility from the President to Congress
when the executive branch is engaged in diplomacy with other countries.
This is most true when the certification is factual in nature and when the
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IV. CERTIFICATION AND THE RuLE OF LAW i\
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
A.- The Costs of Certification Requirements
This discussion has shown that certification requirements
are weak methods of exerting Congressional influence in for-
eign affairs. As such, they reflect unanswerable questions
about the proper limits and respective roles of executive and
legislative power in the formulation and execution of foreign
policy. At the same time, the requirements serve other pur-
poses, which may explain why they are used so frequently de-
spite their ineffectiveness in controlling executive behavior.
However, certification requirements exact significant
costs. First, they impose a burden on the executive branch, in
terms of the administrative costs of compliance, formulation,
and implementation of policy. Most are familiar ith the argu-
ment that the executive branch should have primary responsi-
bility for the conduct of foreign affairs because it is better to
have only one Secretary of State, not some 535 of them.''
One must also ask whether the task of determining whether
the administration has complied with over 100 certification re-
quirements is an unnecessary burden on the executive branch.
Second, certification requirements impose costs on U.S.
relations with the states that are the subjects of those certifica-
tions. This is particularly true when, as is so often the case with
certifications, economic assistance or economic sanctions are
at stake. States like Mexico and Colombia have made clear
that the annual certification process adversely affects their re-
lations with the United States.' 95
certification does not provide the President with a broad "national security"
or "national interest" waiver. In such instances, the executive branch can
argue to a foreign country that, although it would be inclined to take a par-
ticular action (say, for example, to provide economic assistance), its hands
are tied by statute.
194. There are, of course, limitations to this argument. Se supra text ac-
companying notes 54 and 64.
195. See Peter Hakim, U.S. Drug Cerification Process is in &'7ious Nerd of Re
form, CHRisrLN SCIENCE MONITOR, Mar. 27, 1997, at 15 (arguing that the
anti-narcotics certification process provokes conflict between the United
States and other countries); Kathy Lewvis, Clinton Rethinking Cerification Op-
tions, DALLAS MORING NEWs, May 2, 1997, at 10A (quoting Mexican Ambas-
sadorJesus Silva-Herzog as saying: "We Mexicans, we feel that we have been
insulted, and we haven't been treated in the way that you treat a neighbor.");
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Certifications exact an even greater cost. Earlier, this arti-
cle discussed how unilateral action by the executive branch in
foreign affairs is costly because it ultimately hampers the exec-
utive's ability to implement long-term foreign policy goals. "!
However, unilateral action inflicts a greater cost insofar as it
undermines the rule of law:
The pattern of executive-legislative relations,
whereby the president act[s] unilaterally and Con-
gress responds with its law-making power only to find
that the president later disregards the law when polit-
ical circumstances permit, has two detrimental ef-
fects. First, it contributes to a public perception of
Congress as inefficacious .... Second, it works to
undermine a principal tenet of our constitutionalism,
namely, the belief that government is based on 'the
rule of law, not of men.'
1 97
Certification requirements are almost predisposed to cre-
ate situations where the same detrimental effects occur. This is
because certification requirements, for all of the reasons dis-
cussed above, are ultimately ineffective in controlling execu-
tive behavior. When push comes to shove, a certification re-
quirement will not prevent the executive branch from acting,
if it believes that there are compelling reasons to do so, even if
the President does not disregard the certification process. As
has been shown, many certification requirements are so po-
rous, and their enforcement so unlikely, that the President
need only give colorable arguments tojustify a particular certi-
fication. When this happens, and particularly when there is
substantial evidence to the contrary, the public is left with the
impression that the President runs roughshod over the law,
with Congress unable to exercise its prerogatives in foreign af-
fairs. The controversies surrounding the certifications of El
Salvador in the 1980s, the certification of Peru earlier in this
Stanley Meisler, Push to End Certification Intensifies: Narcotics: the Recent Battle
Over Mexico's Status has Led to a Growing Desire in Congress and the White House
for Another System, L.A. TMES, May 26, 1997, at All (discussing, among other
things, strained relations between Mexico and the United States as a result
of the anti-narcotics certification process).
196. See supra text accompanying notes 72-73.
197. KRAF-r, supra note 55, at 154.
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decade, and the certifications of Mexico in the past two years
all demonstrate this point.
The damage to the rule of law caused by such certifica-
tions spreads beyond the domestic sphere. One of the criti-
cisms leveled against the annual anti-narcotics certification
process is that some countries are practically guaranteed certi-
fication, while others are not. This is because the United
States believes it cannot afford to withdraw economic assist-
ance from some countries, while others are not as important
to U.S. interests. 198 The disparity results in inconsistencies in
the application of the law which do not go unnoticed by the
international community. As an expert has noted: "[T]he cer-
tification process and associated policy initiatives are likely to
command decreasing international respect-and in general to
yield diminishing returns over time-if certain countries are
granted de-facto permanent exemptions because of their 'spe-
cial relationship' with the United States."199
B. Reducing the Costs of Certification Requirements
Given that the costs of certification requirements are
high, what can be done to minimize them? In this section, I
suggest that, if certification requirements are to remain a part
of our foreign policy, changes must be made in the legislation
that imposes them and in their enforcement. Congress should
reduce the number of certification requirements it enacts. If
Congress believes that a certification requirement is desirable,
the criteria for the certification should be either very narrow
or very broad. This makes it more likely that the courts will be
inclined to exercise review, which is necessary if these require-
ments are to have the force of law.
198. Rensselaer Lee observes that since 1986, when the anti-narcotics cer-
tification process was first established, Mexico has been consistently certi-
fied, despite complaints that Mexico has been unsuccessful and unwilling to
fight drugs, while Iran has consistently been decertified, despite the fact that
it has a vigorous counter-narcotics program. Perspectives on Cerificalion: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on tMe Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, ,arcotirs and
Terrorism of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 105th Cong. 2 (1998) (testi-
mony of Rensselaer W. Lee, III).
199. Id.
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1. Legislation
An obvious way to minimize the costs imposed by certifica-
tion requirements is to reduce their number. Congress should
use legislative tools, such as earmarking and-when constitu-
tional-express prohibitions, to influence foreign policy. If
Congress wants to avoid being heavy-handed, yet still wants the
President to take into account factors such as human rights,
non-proliferation, or narcotics in framing his foreign policy,
Congress should require the President to issue reports
(roughly analogous to environmental impact statements) as-
sessing the likely impact a contemplated action would have on
a particular area of concern.
Alternatively, if Congress insists on inserting a certifica-
tion requirement into foreign policy legislation, it should en-
sure that the criteria for the certification are either very nar-
row or very broad. Very narrow criteria would require that the
certification turn on precise and, ideally, readily verifiable fac-
tual criteria, which would make the justification of a particular
certification readily apparent. With respect to the anti-narcot-
ics certification process, for example, Congress could impose
numerical criteria, such as numbers of drug seizures, extradi-
tions, etc., to determine whether a country has cooperated
with the United States in anti-narcotics efforts.
Imposing narrower criteria for certifications would re-
duce the number of controversies harmful to the rule of law.
First, it would deter the executive branch from making contro-
versial certifications at the outset. In such circumstances, the
constraining features of certification requirements (discussed
in Part II), are more likely to have some effect, i.e., the possi-
bility of embarrassment or, in rare cases, being caught in pure
deception. Furthermore, if the executive branch goes forward
with a controversial certification, tighter criteria would tend to
reduce controversy; the determination of whether a certifica-
tion was justified would be easier, thereby making it easier for
Congress, or ideally the courts, to review and overturn such a
certification if necessary.
As has been shown, however, Congress often finds it un-
desirable to impose such narrow criteria, which may be an in-
adequate means of addressing a particular foreign policy con-
cern or which, in some circumstances, could block the Presi-
dent from acting in an emergency. In such instances, where
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Congress still wishes to impose a certification requirement, fie
criteria should then be very broad. One example might be a
certification that the contemplated action is in the national
interest. A broad-based certification such as this one might
seem unpalatable. In effect, it would force the executive
branch to concede that a country normally ineligible to re-
ceive economic assistance (say, because it fails to meet interna-
tionally recognized human fights standards) should neverthe-
less qualify for assistance because it is in the national interest
to maintain relations with it. Yet, such a concession at least
creates greater transparency in the decision-making process.
The nation would be spared the controversy and cynicism that
arises when the executive branch certifies that a recipient of
U.S. assistance meets human rights standards, but consider-a-
ble evidence stands starkly to the contrary.2"
2. Judicial Enforcement
The framing of narrower certification requirements is a
necessary (but not sufficient) condition for greaterjudicial re-
view-a second means of reducing the costs of certifications.
It is hard to see how such requirements will have the force of
law if the courts are unwilling to step in when gross violations
of the statutes implementing them are alleged. The alterna-
tive is to have laws with no remedy. A thorough discussion of
this issue requires a close examination of the policies and fun-
damental rationales underlying judicial reluctance to inter-
vene in foreign affairs matters. It is not the purpose of this
article to undertake that task. I will, however, tentatively com-
200. Michael Glennon has made similar arguments with respect to in-
stances when the executive branch has completely disregarded the law on
national security grounds. He writes:
Rather than defending a manifest transgression of the law, the nrle
of law would be better served by acknowledging the transgression
and arguing from necessity rather than legality. Arthur Schlesinger
has wisely written that while the Framers did not rule out the possi-
bility that "crisis might require the executive to act outside the Con-
stitution" neither did they intend to confer constitutional legiti-
macy on such acts, believing that the "legal order would be better
preserved if departures from it were frankly identified s such than
if they were anointed with a fictitious legality and thereby enabled
to serve as constitutional precedents for future action."
GLENNN o, supra note 55, at 284 (citing ARTHUR ScAuILsIcum, THE 1wtI'I.u_
PRESIDFNcy 8 (1973)).
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ment on how the standing, equitable discretion, and political
question doctrines inform judicial review of certification re-
quirements. Of these, the equitable discretion and political
question doctrines (even in their current forms) should not be
used to bar judicial review of certifications in all cases. Until
there are significant changes in the standing doctrine, how-
ever, standing will continue to impose a significant hurdle to
judicial review.
Equitable Discretion. As discussed earlier, this doctrine
stems from the belief that the courts should not circumvent
normal democratic processes. 201 The idea that the courts
should not intervene in cases involving a dispute between a
member of Congress and his or her colleagues is compelling.
But there is a danger that every dispute involving the legality
of a Presidential action could be construed in this way, thereby
precluding members of Congress from ever obtaining review
of Presidential action. There must be times when the courts
should step in to break the potentially endless cycle of execu-
tive action, legislation overturning of such action, executive ac-
tion overturning that action, and so on. If a member of Con-
gress is able to demonstrate the requisite standing to challenge
a certification, then at some point the court should be willing
to hear the case.
The Political Question Doctrine. The political question doc-
trine poses one of the most difficult hurdles to judicial review
of a controversial certification, 202 but courts should not apply
the doctrine too broadly.
Leaving aside questions of the constitutionality of impos-
ing constraints on the executive branch, there are two likely
kinds of disputes related to a certification requirement: proce-
dural disputes and substantive disputes. Procedural disputes
concern executive or legislative compliance with the proce-
dural requirements of a statute imposing a certification re-
quirement. Substantive disputes concern whether a certifica-
tion is justified in light of the statutory criteria governing it.
Procedural disputes should almost never be barred from
review. Asking a court to interpret the procedural require-
ments of a particular statute is a task courts are authorized to
201. See supra text accompanying note 130.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 146-52.
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undertake and, indeed, have undertaken in the past.' ° Sup-
pose a statute requires the President to certify to Congress that
Country A has removed certain weapons from Country B
before economic assistance may be provided to Country A.
Then suppose the President provides the assistance without is-
suing the required certification. It is difficult to see how ,any of
the Baker factors are implicated in overturning executive ac-
tion for failure to follow procedures set out in legislation.
Of course, a more difficult case arises when there is a sub-
stantive dispute. What happens, for example, if the President
certifies that a particular action is vital to the interests of the
United States, or certifies that a particular country is cooperat-
ing ith the United States in the war against drugs? Should a
court, in light of the political question doctrine, review these
kinds of decisions?
Answering this question is difficult First, there is the
broad range of certifications the executive branch makes. Sec-
ond, the present state of the law is unclear. The courts have
never held that the political question doctrine bars adjudica-
tion of a controversy over the substance of a certification.2
-Y
At first glance, it appears unlikely that such an action would
survive scrutiny under Baker, especially considering whether
the controversy involves a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards. A court would probably decide that it
was unable to create standards for determining whether a cer-
tification was substantively "correct."
Faced with a controversy over substance, however, the
court should first determine what kind of certification the ex-
ecutive has made. If the statute requires a certification clearly
based on policy (such as a certification that a particular action
is in the national interest), then a court ought to refuse to
hear the case. In such situations, prudential concerns underly-
ing the Baker factors carry the most weight-the formulation
and implementation of foreign policy rests with the political
branches. Deciding, for example, whether the President %%as
203. See, e.g., Adkins v. United States, 68 F.3d 1317, 1326 (3rd Cir. 1996)
(holding that the political question doctrine does not bar a suit in which a
retired officer alleged procedural violations in connection with die Secretary
of the Army's decision to deny the officer promotion).
204. They have, however, been asked to consider this issue. Sce Croadll,
558 F.Supp. at 902.
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correct in certifying that a particular action was in the interest
of the United States would require, at a minimum, a court to
answer, in essence, the question of what the foreign policy and
security interests of the United States are. The courts have
rarely, if ever, answered this, poorly equipped as they are to do
so. Moreover, if there are competing foreign policy interests,
the court would have to choose which interests are control-
ling. 20 5 Then the court would have to determine whether the
contemplated action would further those interests. It is hard
to imagine a court making these kinds of decisions.
But even here there is room for debate. Courts frequently
determine the interests of the United States. For example, in
determining whether the state secrets doctrine blocks the dis-
covery of potentially sensitive information, the court must de-
termine whether the information, if disclosed, would reason-
ably be expected to have an adverse effect on U.S. security in-
terests.20 6 Furthermore, faced with the task of statutory
interpretation, courts frequently glean and pronounce Con-
gressional policy in order to determine whether a particular
judicial outcome furthers that policy or defeats it.
However, in statutory interpretation, the underlying pol-
icy behind a statute is either express or implied. The court's
task is to apply the statute in manner consistent with that pol-
icy. Congress has formulated the policy, having chosen among
competing interests. Certification requirements, by contrast,
are sometimes part of statutory schemes that invite the consid-
eration and weighing of competing policy interests. Thus, a
statute that forbids the production of chemical weapons ex-
presses a policy that because such weapons represent a danger
to society, the United States should not contribute to their de-
velopment. The incorporation of an exception that allows for
the production of such weapons if the President certifies that
such an action is in the United States's security interests invites
more policy-making. In such instances, the courts should not
intervene.
205. This is true unless the statute in question expressly states that a par-
ticular element of foreign policy, such as human rights considerations, is
controlling. This, in my view, would rarely be the case.
206. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953); Halkin v. Helms, 690
F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
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What about certifications that appear on their face to be
more factual in nature? Courts make and review factual find-
ings all the time. Yet even here a number of problems arise,
all of which may deter a court from entering the fray. For ex-
ample, say a factual certification involves classified informa-
tion. It could be argued that there are nojudicially "discovera-
ble" standards with which to adjudicate the issue.
The courts have refused to exercise jurisdiction over cases
in which classified information is involved. In Sanclez-Espinoza
v. Reagan,207 for example, the court dismissed on political
question grounds a suit brought by Nicaraguan citizens, mem-
bers of Congress, and private citizens seeking to enjoin U.S.
activities against Nicaragua. Members of the House of Repre-
sentatives alleged, among other things, that certain members
of the Reagan Administration had violated the so-called Bo-
land Amendment,20° which prohibited the Central Intelli-
gence Agency (CIA) and the Department of Defense from us-
ing any of the funds provided in the Department of Defense
Appropriations Act of 1983 for military activities aimed at over-
throwing the government of Nicaragua. Using the political
question doctrine to dismiss the case, the court reasoned, in
part, that the lack of judicially discoverable or manageable
standards required such dismissal. The court believed that
holding otherwise would require it to look into sensitive mili-
tary affairs, and it questioned whether covert activities of the
CIA and the military in Nicaragua would be discoverable
under the state secrets doctrine.20
9
Given this reluctance to delve into classified matters,
courts might be more likely to dismiss a challenge to a certifi-
cation that involves state secrets. For example, if Congress
challenged a Presidential certification that Country X does not
possess nuclear weapons, the government could argue that the
only way to prove or disprove this assertion would require the
disclosure of information that is privileged under the state
secrets doctrine.
The mere fact that a case might involve sensitive informa-
tion, however, should not automatically preclude review. The
207. 568 F. Supp. 596 (D.D.C. 1983).
208. Pub. L. No. 97 - 337, § 793, 96 StaL 1830, 1865 (1982). The Bokmd
Amendments have been compiled at 26 I.L.M. 433, 440 (1987).
209. See Sanchez-Espinoza, 568 F. Supp. at 600.
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Sanchez-Espinoza court did not go far enough in its analysis. 2"1
The court should have asked at least two additional questions,
stemming from state secrets analysis. Assuming, arguendo, that
certain classified information is central to prove the plaintiff's
case, the court should ask whether the plaintiff can continue
its case based on evidence that is not privileged. If not, the
court should determine whether the case should be dismissed
on those grounds or whether, in fairness to the plaintiff, the
relative positions of the parties should be adjusted to account
for the application of the privilege. These two prongs already
form part of the state secrets analysis. Thus, the state secrets
doctrine, not the political question doctrine, should be used in
substantive controversies over a certification that involves clas-
sified material. To be sure, a number of cases may not be al-
lowed to go forward because evidence needed to prove the
plaintiffs case is privileged. However, the plaintiff should at
least be given the opportunity to present evidence that is not
privileged but sufficient to prove its case.
Another set of controversies may arise when certifications
are "factual," yet move beyond what may be termed verifiable
propositions of fact. A certification such as "Pakistan does not
possess nuclear weapons" may be deemed "factual." A state-
ment that is more akin to an "assessment" of a given fact situa-
tion goes further, as it may entail policy judgments normally
left to the political branches. For example, how would a court
adjudicate the validity of a certification that a country has co-
operated fully with the United States in achieving compliance
with international anti-narcotics requirements? Here, the cer-
tification appears to be based on a mixture of policy, fact, and
law. Of course, any resolution of these issues turns on the facts
of a given case. Yet courts appear to be more willing to hear
cases involving these kinds of questions if the cases can be
framed in terms of statutory interpretation or constitutionality.
Three examples are relevant here.
In Population Institute, Population Council v. McPherson,211
plaintiffs challenged a decision by the U.S. Agency for Interna-
tional Development (USAID) to withhold funds for China that
had been earmarked by Congress for the United Nations Fund
210. For this reason, the "judicially discoverable standards" prong is
flawed.
211. 797 F.2d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
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for Population Activities (UNFPA). USAID defended its ac-
tion by arguing that the Foreign Assistance and Related Pro-
grams Appropriations Act of 1985212 prohibited the agency
from funding "any organization... which... supports or par-
ticipates in the management of a program of coercive abortion
or involuntary sterilization." It further claimed that the polit-
ical question doctrine barred the plaintiffs from bringing the
case. The district court agreed and dismissed the case.
On appeal, the D.C. circuit rejected USAID's argument,
finding that the Baker factors did not preclude review. In par-
ticular, the court conceded that part of the Administrator's de-
cision rested on his assessment of China's policies with respect
to abortion. However, the court found that the Administra-
tor's decision also rested on a comparison of that assessment
with his interpretation of the requirements of the statutory
prohibition. And, although the court might have deferred to
USAID's judgment with respect to the former, it felt no need
to do so with respect to the latter:
The question that is then presented for our review is
whether the Administrator has arrived at the determi-
nation that he is required to make by statute with
due regard for the intent of Congress in enacting
that statute. Simply because the result of that deter-
mination will have an effect on international rela-
tions does not completely strip the courts of the
power and duty to review the legislative interpreta-
tion that supports the decision. The judiciary is well
situated to decide if the Administrator has relied
upon a supportable interpretation of the amend-
ment.
2 13
Four years later, in Dellums v. Bush,2 14 the court found that
the political question doctrine would not bar the judiciar%
from deciding whether military actions against Iraq consti-
tuted "war" for purposes of the War Powers clause. In that
case, members of Congress sought an injunction preventing
President Bush from initiating hostilities against Iraq without
first securing a declaration of war or other authorization from
Congress. The Department ofJustice argued that the political
212. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837, 1887-88 (1984).
213. McPherson, 797 F.2d at 1068-69.
214. 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990).
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question doctrine precluded the court from determining
whether the President was required to seek such a declaration
or authorization.
The court rejected the Department of Justice's argument,
observing that "courts do not lack the power and the ability to
make the factual and legal determination of whether this na-
tion's military actions constitute war for purposes of the consti-
tutional War Clause." 215 The court was not persuaded by argu-
ments that the political question doctrine barred the case
from being heard because resolution of the issue would em-
broil the court in foreign affairs. The court reasoned that the
Baker principles do not bar courts from hearing cases just be-
cause they might have some connection with foreign affairs. It
pointed out that the courts have a long history of determining
whether the country was at war for purposes of construing
treaties, statutes, and insurance contracts. 216 Because the com-
plaint alleged that there were massive concentrations of troops
in Saudi Arabia and that the President intended to invade Iraq
(as evidenced by the procurement of a U.N. Security Council
vote authorizing the use of force against Iraq), and in light of
the factors discussed, the court concluded: "[A] n offensive en-
try into Iraq by several hundred thousand United States ser-
vicemen under the conditions described above could be de-
scribed as a 'war' within the meaning of Article I, Section 8,
Clause 11, of the Constitution.
217
Thus, there are instances where courts are willing to hear
questions of law and fact that bear on foreign and military af-
fairs. However, the facts in Dellums are quite extraordinary; it
could be argued that anyone at that time-let alone the
court-would make no other conclusion but that the United
States was indeed preparing to go to war against Iraq. A dis-
pute about a certification could arise on closer facts, however.
Even the Dellums court speculated that in close cases it might
be prepared to grant greater deference to the political
branches: "That is not to say that, assuming that the issue is
factually close or ambiguous or fraught with intricate technical
military and diplomatic baggage, the courts would not defer to
the political branches to determine whether or not particular
215. Id. at 1145.
216. See id. at 1146.
217. Id.
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hostilities might qualify as a 'war.'"218 Here, the court seemed
to say that in such cases the political question doctrine might
bar review of controversies between Congress and the Presi-
dent.
Such was the case in Lowy v. Reagan,2' 9 a case decided
three years before Dellums. The issue was whether a Presiden-
tial decision to reflag Kuwraiti ships to protect them against
Iran constituted a violation of the War Powers Resolution.2 -0
The answer turned on whether the U.S. action constituted
"hostilities" for purposes of the resolution. The court found
that the political question doctrine, particularly the judicially
discoverable and manageable standards prong, barred it from
resolving the question. The court reasoned that the very fact
that the War Powers Resolution does not define the term "hos-
tilities" implies that Congress wanted the political branches
alone to resolve any disputes regarding whether a particular
situation constitutes hostilities.2 2 It stated that this factual de-
termination, i.e., whether the action constituted hostilities, if
undertaken by the court, would be hampered by lack of intelli-
gence information and expertise.
2 2 2
The court's reasoning in Lowy leaves much to be desired.
For one thing, if Congress leaves a term in a statute undefined,
it does not necessarily follow that Congress wants the political
branches to define it. Indeed, one may infer the exact oppo-
site: by not defining a term, Congress may intend the courts to
fill in the statute's contours through decisional law. Second,
with respect to the need for intelligence information, as this
article argues above, a party bringing a complaint should have
the opportunity to present unclassified information to substan-
tiate its claims. Alternatively, such evidence can be reviewed
by the court in camera. But this is not to say that there will
never be an instance when deciding whether a particular certi-
fication is justified involves close questions of fact and law. In
such instances, it may well be appropriate to deny review.
Standing. Modem standing doctrine poses a significant
hurdle to judicial review of a certification-for individuals,
218. Id. at 1145.
219. 676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C. 1987).
220. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (1994).
221. See id. at 340 n.53.
222. See id.
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special interest groups, and members of Congress alike.22 3 As
this article argues above, under current law it is still possible
for members of Congress to demonstrate the required stand-
ing. How likely is it that individuals or private interest groups
will achieve standing to challenge a certification? The con-
cepts of injury, causation, and redressability will undoubtedly
continue to change according to prevailing jurisprudential
currents. Yet no matter how these elements are construed, the
courts are not likely to conclude that they are empowered to
entertain citizen suits any time soon. The injury requirement,
or some equivalent thereof, will generally continue to bar indi-
viduals from challenging certification requirements in the
courts. Individuals will continue to have their only recourse at
the polls. As discussed above, individuals from abroad, as well
as special interest groups, may have better chances with claims
that they have suffered sufficient injury, but the problem of
third-party actors makes it difficult for such plaintiffs to over-
come the hurdles of causation and redressability.
A total rethinking of the standing doctrine must occur
before individuals and public interest groups will be able to
successfully allege standing in order to challenge certification
requirements. Until the requisite changes occur, standing will
continue to prove a significant bar to judicial review. 22 1" This
makes it even more important for Congress to act sparingly in
enacting certification requirements. Except in very rare cases,
certification requirements will not be enforced by the courts.
V. CONCLUSION
This article began with two controversies involving certifi-
cation requirements. The aims of this discussion were two-
fold: first, to provide a framework for understanding and eval-
uating this relatively simple legislative tool, which-appearing
throughout our foreign policy legislation-has the potential to
223. See supra text accompanying notes 101-29.
224. Some scholars have suggested that justiciability doctrines like stand-
ing, ripeness, and mootness should be separated from Article III concerns.
See, e.g., Evan Tsen Lee, DeconstitutionalizingJusticiability: The Example of Moot-
ness, 105 HARv. L. REv. 605 (1992) (arguing that the mootness doctrine can
be separated from Article III policy concerns and made into a prudential
doctrine); Patricia M. Wald, The Cinematic Supreme Court: 1991-92 Tern, 7 AD.
MIN. L. REv. Am. U. 238, 239 (1993) (arguing that the three-prong standing
test cannot be derived from the "case or controversy" requirement).
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harm the rule of law; and second, to suggest ways in which
such harm can be avoided. It should now be clearer that certi-
fication requirements, and the controversies which attend
them, are emblematic. They represent, if not an underlying
problem, an underlying reality, in the manner in which we
have organized our national government. Many of the
problems associated with these requirements will not disap-
pear until the underlying reality changes, which is not likely,
nor perhaps even desirable. Yet greater knowledge of this
tool, including its capabilities, limitations, and costs, leads to
the conclusion that it should be used more wisely and less
often. When it is used, the certification requirement should
be crafted to make it less likely that controversies such as those
surrounding the certifications of Mexico and China will hap-
pen again.
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APPENDIX
RECENT U.S. FOREIGN POLICY
LEGISLATION IMPOSING PRESIDENTIAL
CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
I. LEGISLATION CONCERNING SPECIFIC STATES
Afghanistan
22 U.S.C. § 2374 (1994).
Albania
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1999,
Pub. L. No. 105-262, § 8115, 112 Stat. 2279, 2327
(1998) (also listed under "Macedonia," "Yugosla-
via," and "Deployment of U.S. Armed Forces
Abroad").
Angola
12 U.S.C. § 635(b) (11) (1994) (also listed under "Fi-
nancial Organizations" and "Human Rights").
Australia
22 U.S.C. § 2776 (1994) (also listed under 'Japan,"
"New Zealand," "NATO," and "Defense Assist-
ance").
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-261,
§ 1004(c), 112 Stat. 1920, 2112 (1998).
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105-56, § 8132, 111 Stat. 1203, 1250
(1997).
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-85, § 1203, 111 Stat. 1629,
1929 (1997).
1998 Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions
Act, Pub. L. No. 105-174, § 16, 112 Stat. 58, 66
(1998).




Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 570, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-
166 (1996) (also listed under "Human Rights" and
"Narcotics").
Customs and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-382,
§ 138, 104 Stat. 629, 653 (1990) (also listed under
"Human Rights" and "Narcotics").
Chile
International Security and Development Coopera-
tion Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-113, § 726(b), 95
Stat. 1519, 1554 (1981), as amended by Pub. L. No.
99-83, sec. 715, §726 (c) 99 Stat. 190, 247 (1985)
and Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No.
101-513, Title V, § 544(b), 104 Stat. 1979, 2019
(1990) (also listed under "Human Rights" and
"Terrorism").
China
Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-261,
§ 1512, 112 Stat. 1920, 2174 (1998).
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-118, § 523, 111 Stat. 2386, 2412 (1997) (also
listed under "Cuba,""Iran," "Iraq," and "Libya").
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 523, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-
148 (1997) (also listed under "Cuba," "Iran,"
"Iraq," "Libya," and "North Korea").
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-107, § 523, 110 Stat. 704, 729 (1996) (also
listed under "Cuba," "Iran," "Iraq," and "Libya").
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1995, Pub. L. No.
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103-106, § 523, 108 Stat. 1608, 1632 (1995) (also
listed under "Cuba," "Iran," "Iraq," and "Libya").
Chinese Student Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-404, § 2(c), 106 Stat. 1969, 1970 (1992) (also
listed under "Human Rights").
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years
1990 and 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-246, § 902, 104
Stat. 15, 83 (1990).
Cuba
22 U.S.C. § 6006 (1994) (also listed under "Human
Rights").
22 U.S.C. § 6062 (1994).
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-118, § 523, 111 Stat. 2386, 2412 (1997) (also
listed under "China," "Iran," "Iraq," and "Libya").
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 523, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-
148 (1997) (also listed under "China," "Iran,"
"Iraq," "Libya," and "North Korea").
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-107, § 523, 110 Stat. 704, 729 (1996) (also
listed under "China," "Iran," "Iraq," and "Libya").
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1995, Pub. L. No.
103-106, § 523, 108 Stat. 1608, 1632 (1995) (also
listed under "China," "Iraq," "Iran," and "Libya").
Democratic Republic of Congo
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-118, § 585, 111 Stat. 2386, 2437 (1997) (also
listed under "Human Rights").




22 U.S.C. § 2373 (1994) (also listed under "Turkey"
and "Defense Assistance").
Haiti
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No.
105- 118, § 562, 111 Stat. 2386, 2427 (1997) (also
listed under "Economic Reform" and "Human
Rights").
Iran
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-118, § 523, 111 Stat. 2386, 2412 (1997) (also
listed under "China," "Cuba," "Iraq," and "Libya").
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 523, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-
148 (1997) (also listed under "China," "Cuba,"
"Iraq," "Libya," and "North Korea").
Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-172, §§ 8-9, 110 Stat. 1541, 1545-47 (1996)
(also listed under "Libya").
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-107, 110 Stat. 704, 718 (Also listed under "Fi-
nancial Organizations").
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-107, § 523, 110 Stat. 704, 729 (1996) (also
listed under "China," "Cuba," "Iraq," and "Libya").
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1995, Pub. L. No.
103-106, § 523, 108 Stat. 1608, 1632 (1995) (also
listed under "China," "Cuba," "Iraq," and "Libya").
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Iraq
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-118, § 534, 111 Stat. 2386, 2416 (1997).
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-118, § 523, 111 Stat. 2386, 2412 (1997) (also
listed under "China," "Cuba," "Iran," and "Libya").
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 523, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-
148 (1996) (also listed under "China," "Cuba,"
"Iran," "Libya," and "North Korea").
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 533, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-
152 (1996) (also listed under "Serbia and Monte-
negro").
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-107, § 523, 110 Stat. 704, 729 (1996) (also
listed under "China," "Cuba," "Iran," and "Libya").
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1995, Pub. L. No.
103-106, § 523, 108 Stat. 1608, 1632 (1995) (also
listed under "China," "Cuba," "Iran," and "Libya").
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-87, § 539, 107 Stat. 931, 957 (1993).
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-
391, § 573, 106 Stat. 1633, 1666 (1993).
Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-513,
§ 586H, 104 Stat. 1979, 2052-54 (1990).




Anglo-Irish Agreement Support Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-415, § 5, 100 Stat. 947, 948 (1986).
Japan
22 U.S.C. § 2776 (1994) (also listed under "Austra-
lia," "New Zealand," "NATO," and "Defense Assist-
ance").
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1991,
Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8105, 104 Stat. 1856, 1902
(1990).
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1989,
Pub. L. No. 100-463, § 8125(f), 102 Stat. 2270,
2270-60 (1988), as amended by National Defense Au-
thorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991, Pub.
L. No. 101-189, § 1623(3), 103 Stat. 1352, 1606
(1989) (also listed under "South Korea" and "De-
ployment of U.S. Armed Forces Abroad").
Liberia
Peace Process in Liberia, Pub. L. No. 102-270, § (b),
106 Stat. 106, 106-07 (1992).
Libya
Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-172, § 8, 110 Stat. 1541, 1546 (1996) (also
listed under "Iran").
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-118, § 523, 111 Stat. 2386, 2412 (1997) (also
listed under "China," "Cuba," "Iran," and "Iraq").
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-118, § 582, 111 Stat. 2386, 2435 (1997).
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 523, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-
148 (1996) (also listed under "China," "Cuba,"
"Iran," "Iraq," and "North Korea").
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Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-107, § 523, 110 Stat. 704, 729 (1996) (also
listed under "China," "Cuba," "Iran," and "Iraq").
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1995, Pub. L. No.
103-106, § 523, 108 Stat. 1608, 1632 (1995) (also
listed under "China," "Cuba," "Iran," and "Iraq").
Macedonia
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1999,
Pub. L. No. 105-262, § 8115, 112 Stat. 2279, 2327
(1998) (also listed under "Albania" 'Yugoslavia,"
and "Deployment of U.S. Armed Forces Abroad").
Mauritania
Human Rights, Refugee, and Other Foreign Rela-
tions Provisions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-319,
§ 202, 110 Stat. 3864, 3866 (1996) (also listed
under "Human Rights").
New Zealand
22 U.S.C. § 2776 (1994) (also listed under "Austra-
lia," 'Japan," "NATO, and "Defense Assistance").
North Korea
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 523, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-
148 (1997) (also listed under "China," "Cuba,"
"Iran," "Iraq," and "Libya").
Pakistan
22 U.S.C. § 2375 (1994) (also listed under "Arms
Control/Non-Proliferation").
Russia
Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-261,
§ 1304, 112 Stat. 1920, 2163 (1998) (also listed
under "Arms Control/Non-Proliferation").
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Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-118, 111 Stat. 2386, 2396 (1997) (also listed
under "Arms Control/Non-Proliferation") [tit. II,
under heading "Assistance for the New Independ-
ent States of the Former Soviet Union" (j) ].
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-118, § 577, 111 Stat. 2386, 2432 (1997) (also
listed under "Human Rights").
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-85, § 1406, 111 Stat. 1629,
1961 (1997) (also listed under "Arms Control/
Non-Proliferation").
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 9002(o)(1), 110 Stat. 3009,
3009-131 (1996) (also listed under "Arms Control/
Non-Proliferation").
National Defense Authorization Act for 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-160, § 1612, 107 Stat. 1547, 1850 (1993)
(also listed under "Arms Control/Non-Prolifera-
tion").
Serbia and Montenegro
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 533, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-
152 (1996) (also listed under "Iraq").
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 540, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-
155 (1996).
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-107, § 540A, 110 Stat. 704, 737 (1996) (also
listed under "Human Rights").
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National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 1511, 107 Stat. 1547,
1840 (1993).
Slovenia
NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, § 606, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-173 (1996) (also
listed under "NATO").
South Korea
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1989,
Pub. L. No. 100-463, § 8125(f), 102 Stat. 2270,
2270-41 (1988), as amended by National Defense
Authoriza-tion Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991,
Pub. L. No. 101-189, § 1623(3), 103 Stat. 1352,
1606 (1989) (also listed under 'Japan" and "De-
ployment of U.S. Armed Forces Abroad").
Turkey
22 U.S.C. § 2373 (1994) (also listed under "Greece"
and "Defense Assistance").
Ukraine
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-118, 111 Stat. 2386, 2396 (1997) [tit. II, under
heading "Assistance for the New Independent
States of the Former Soviet Union" (k)].
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 90 0 2(q), 110 Stat. 3009,
3009-132 (1996).
Vietnam
Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, theJu-
diciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 609, 111 Stat. 2440,
2517 (1997).
Yugoslavia
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1999,
Pub. L. No. 105-262, § 8115, 112 Stat. 2279, 2327
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(1998) (also listed under "Albania," "Macedonia,"
and "Deployment of U.S. Armed Forces Abroad").
Middle East/Persian Gulf
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-118, § 586, 111 Stat. 2386, 2437 (1997).
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years
1992 and 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-138, tiL IV, § 403,
105 Stat. 647, 721 (1991) (also listed under "Arms
Control/Non-Proliferation" and "Defense Assist-
ance").
Newly Independent States
22 U.S.C. § 2295a (1994) (also listed under "Human
Rights").
22 U.S.C. § 5852 (1994) (also listed under "Arms
Control/Non-Proliferation").
22 U.S.C. § 5902 (1994) (also listed under "Arms
Control/Non-Proliferation" and "Human Rights").
22 U.S.C. § 5952 (1994) (also listed under "Arms
Control/Non-Proliferation" and "Human Rights").
50 U.S.C. § 2333 (1994) (also listed under "Arms
Control/Non-Proliferation").
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-107, fit. II, 110 Stat. 704, 713 (1996) (also listed
under "Arms Control/Non-Proliferation").
National Defense Authorization Act for 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-106, § 1208, 110 Stat. 186, 470 (1996) (also
listed under "Arms Control/Non-Proliferation").
Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-228, § 211, 105 Stat. 1691, 1693 (1991), as
amended by National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-484, § 1421(a),
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106 Stat. 2315, 2565 (1992) and National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-106, § 1204, 110 Stat. 186, 470 (1996) (also
listed under "Arms Control/Non-Proliferation").
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years
1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-180, § 223, 101
Stat. 1019, 1056 (1987), as amended by Act For Re-
form In Emerging New Democracies and Support
and Help for Improved Partnership with Russia,
Ukraine, and Other New Independent States, Pub.
L. No. 103-199, Title II, § 203(a), 107 Stat. 2317,
2321 (1993) (also listed under "Strategic Defense
Initiative").
Palestine Liberation Organization
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-118, § 552, 111 Stat. 2386, 2422 (1997).
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related P
Programs Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-118, § 566, 111 Stat. 2386, 2428 (1997).
Middle East Peace Facilitation Act of 1995, Title VI,
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Re-
lated Programs Appropriations Act, 1996, Pub. Law
No. 104-107, § 603(c), 110 Stat. 755, 758-59 (1997).
Global Climate Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L. No.
100-204, Title X, § 1005, 101 Stat. 1407, 1408
(1987).
II. LEGISLATION CONCERNING MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
22 U.S.C. § 2776 (1994) (also listed under "Austra-
lia," 'Japan," "New Zealand," and "Defense Assist-
ance").
NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act, Pub. L. No. 104-
208, § 606, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-173 (1996) (also
listed under "Slovenia").




50 U.S.C. § 404g (Supp. 1993).
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-118, § 564, 111 Stat. 2386, 2428 (1997).
International Energy Agency
42 U.S.C. § 6274 (1994).
Im. LEGISLATION ON SPECIFIC FoREIGN Po, cV ISSUES
Abortion
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-118, § 518, 111 Stat. 2386, 2311 (1997).
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-107, § 518, 110 Stat. 704, 727 (1996).
Arab Boycott
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years
1994 and 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-236, § 564, 108
Stat. 382, 484 (1994), as amended by Foreign Rela-
tions Laws Technical Amendments, Pub. L. No.
103-415, § 1(l), 108 Stat. 4299, 4301 (1994) (also
listed under "Defense Assistance").
Arms Control/Non-Proliferation
12 U.S.C. § 635(b) (4) (1994) (also listed under "Fi-
nancial Organizations").
22 U.S.C. § 2375 (1994) (also listed under "Paki-
Stan").
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22 U.S.C. § 2797a (1994).
22 U.S.C. § 2797b (1994).
22 U.S.C. § 2798 (1994).
22 U.S.C. § 2799aa (1994).
22 U.S.C. § 2799aa-1 (Supp. 1994).
22 U.S.C. § 5605 (1994).
22 U.S.C. § 5852 (1994) (also listed under "Newly In-
dependent States").
22 U.S.C. § 5902 (1994) (also listed under "Newly In-
dependent States" and "Human Rights").
22 U.S.C. § 5952 (1994) (also listed under "Newly In-
dependent States" and "Human Rights").
22 U.S.C. § 6301 (1994).
22 U.S.C. § 6303 (1994).
50 U.S.C. § 1516 (1994).
50 U.S.C. § 1519 (1994).
50 U.S.C. § 1519a (1994).
50 U.S.C. § 2333 (1994) (also listed under "Newly In-
dependent States").
50 U.S.C. appendix § 2410b (1994).
50 U.S.C. appendix. § 2410c (1994).
Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-261,
§ 1304, 112 Stat. 1920, 2163 (1998) (also listed
under "Russia").
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No.
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105-118, 111 Stat. 2386, 2396 (1997) (also listed
under "Russia") [tit. II, under the heading "Assist-
ance for the New Independent States of the For-
mer Soviet Union" (j)].
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-118, 111 Stat. 2386, 2399 (1997) [tit. II, under
the heading "Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism,
Demining and Related Programs"] (Korean Penin-
sula Energy Development Corporation).
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-85, § 1406, 111 Stat. 1629,
1961 (1997) (also listed under "Russia").
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 9002(o) (1), 110 Stat. 3009,
3009-131 (1996) (also listed under "Russia").
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-107, Tide II, 110 Stat. 704, 713 (1996) (also
listed under "Newly Independent States").
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-107, Tide IV, 110 Stat. 704, 721 (1996) (Ko-
rean Peninsula Energy Development Corpora-
tion).
National Defense Authorization Act for 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-106, § 1208, 110 Stat. 186, 470 (1996) (also
listed under "Newly Independent States").
National Defense Authorization Act for 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-106, § 1209, 110 Stat. 186, 472 (1996).
National Defense Authorization Act for 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-160, § 1612, 107 Stat. 1547, 1850 (1993)
(also listed under "Russia").
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Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years
1992 and 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-138, § 403, 105
Stat. 647, 721 (1991) (also listed under "Middle
East/Persian Gulf' and "Defense Assistance").
Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102-228, § 211, 105 Stat. 1691, 1693 (1991), as
amended by National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-484, § 1421 (a) ,
106 Stat. 2315, 2565 (1992) and National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-106, § 1204, 110 Stat. 186, 470 (1996) (also
listed under "Newly Independent States").
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years
1992 and 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-138, tit. IV, 105
Stat. 647, 718 (1991) (also listed under "Middle
East/Persian Gulf' and "Defense Assistance").
Defense Assistance
12 U.S.C. § 635(b) (6) (1994) (also listed under "Fi-
nancial Organizations," "Human Rights," and
"Narcotics").
22 U.S.C. § 2304 (1994) (also listed under "Human
Rights").
22 U.S.C. § 2373 (1994) (also listed under "Greece"
and "Turkey").
22 U.S.C. § 2753 (1994).
22 U.S.C. § 2776 (1994) (also listed under "Austra-
lia," 'Japan," "New Zealand," and "NATO").
22 U.S.C. § 2781 (Supp. 11 1996) (also listed under
"Terrorism").
22 U.S.C. § 2796a (1994).
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years
1994 and 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-236, § 564, 108
Stat. 382, 484 (1994), as amended by Foreign Rela-
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ions Laws Technical Amendments, Pub. L. No.
103-415, § 1(1), 108 Stat. 4299, 4301 (1994) (also
listed under "Arab Boycott").
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years
1992 and 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-138, Title IV,
§ 403, 105 Stat. 647, 721 (1991) (also listed under
"Middle East/Persian Gulf' and "Arms Control/
Non-Proliferation").
Deployment of U.S. Armed Forces Abroad
50 U.S.C. § 1544 (1994).
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1999,
Pub. L. No. 105-262, § 8115, 112 Stat. 2279, 2327
(1998) (also listed under "Albania," "Macedonia,"
and "Yugoslavia").
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1989,
Pub. L. No. 100-463, § 8125(f), 102 Stat. 2270,
2270-41 (1988), as amended by National Defense
Authoriza-tion Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991,
Pub. L. No. 101-189, § 1623(3), 103 Stat. 1352,
1606 (1989) (also listed under "Japan" and "South
Korea").
Economic Reform
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No.
105- 118, § 562, 111 Stat. 2386, 2427 (1997) (also
listed under "Haiti" and "Human Rights").
Environment
Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Ju-
diciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-162, § 609, 103 Stat. 988,
1037 (1989).
Export Controls
50 U.S.C. appendix § 2402 (1994).
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50 U.S.C. appendix § 2404 (1994).
50 U.S.C. appendix § 2405 (1994).
50 U.S.C. appendix § 2406 (1994).
Expropriation
22 U.S.C. § 1975 (1994).
22 U.S.C. § 2364 (1994).
22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (1994).
22 U.S.C. § 2370a (1994).
Financial Organizations
12 U.S.C. § 635(b) (11) (1994) (Export-Import Bank)
(also listed under "Angola" and "Human Rights").
12 U.S.C. § 635(b) (4) (1994) (Export-Import Bank)
(also listed under "Arms Control/Non-Prolifera-
tion").
12 U.S.C. § 635(b) (6) (1994) (Export-Import Bank)
(also listed under "Defense Assistance," "Human
Rights," and "Narcotics").
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-107, 110 Stat. 704, 718 (1996) [tit. IV, under
the heading "Contribution to the International De-
velop-ment Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment"] (World Bank) (also listed under "Iran").
Human Rights
12 U.S.C. § 635(b)(2) (1994) (also listed under "An-
gola" and "Financial Organizations").
12 U.S.C. § 635(b) (6) (1994) (also listed under "De-
fense Assistance," "Financial Organizations," and
"Narcotics").
22 U.S.C. § 2295a (1994) (also listed under "Newly
Independent States").
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22 U.S.C. § 2304 (1994) (also listed under "Defense
Assistance").
22 U.S.C. § 5902 (1994) (also listed under "Newly In-
dependent States" and "Arms Control/Non-
Proliferation").
22 U.S.C. § 5952 (1994) (also listed under "Newly In-
dependent States" and "Arms Control/Non-
Proliferation").
22 U.S.C. § 6006 (1994) (also listed under "Cuba").
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act 1997,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 570, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-
166 (1996) (also listed under "Burma" and "Nar-
cotics").
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-118, § 562, 111 Stat. 2386, 2427 (1997) (also
listed under "Economic Reform" and "Haiti").
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No.
104-208, § 577, 111 Stat. 2386, 2432 (1997) (also
listed under "Russia").
Human Rights, Refugee, and Other Foreign Rela-
tions Provisions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-319,
§ 202, 110 Stat. 3864, 3866 (1996) (also listed
under "Mauritania").
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-118, § 585, 111 Stat. 2386, 2437 (1997) (also
listed under "Democratic Republic of Congo").
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-107, § 540A, 110 Stat. 704, 737 (1996) (also lis-
tedunder "Serbia and Montenegro").
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Chinese Student Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-404, § 2(c), 106 Stat. 1969, 1970 (1992) (also
listed under "China").
Customs and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-382,
§ 138, 104 Stat. 629, 653 (1990) (also listed under
"Burma" and "Narcotics").
International Security and Development Coopera-
tion Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-113, § 726(b), 95
Stat. 1519, 1554 (1981), as amended by Pub. L. No.
99-83, sec. 715, § 726(c), 99 Stat. 190, 247 (1985)
and Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No.
101-513, tit. V, § 544(b), 104 Stat. 1979, 2019
(1990) (also listed under "Chile" and "Terror-
ism").
Military Coups
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 508, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-
141 (1996).
Narcotics
12 U.S.C. § 635(b)(6) (1994) (also listed under "De-
fense Assistance," "Financial Organizations," and
"Human Rights").
19 U.S.C. § 2492 (1994).
22 U.S.C. § 2291j (1994).
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 570, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-
166 (1996) (also listed under "Burma" and
"Human Rights").
Customs and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-382,
§ 138, 104 Stat. 629, 653 (1990) (also listed under
"Burma" and "Human Rights").
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690,
§ 4702(e), 102 Stat. 4181, 4292 (1988), as amended
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by Pub. L. No. 103-447, § 103(b), 108 Stat. 4691,
4693 (1994).
Pedophilia
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years
1994 and 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-236, tit. I, pt. A,
§ 102(g), 108 Stat. 388, 389 (1994).
State Department: Technical Amendments, Pub. L.
No. 103-415, § 1(o), 108 Stat. 4299, 4301 (1994).
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
22 U.S.C. § 6207 (1994).
Strategic Defense Initiative
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years
1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-180, § 223, 101
Stat. 1019, 1056 (1987), as amended by Act For Re-
form in Emerging New Democracies and Support
and Help for Improved Partnership with Russia,
Ukraine, and Other New Independent States, Pub.
L. No. 103-199, tit. II, § 203(a), 107 Stat. 2317,
2321 (1993) (also listed under "Newly Independ-
ent States").
Further Continuing Appropriations, 1985, Pub. L.
No. 99-190, § 101(b) in part, 99 Stat. 1185, 1219
(1985).
Terrorism
22 U.S.C. § 2781 (Supp. 11 1997) (also listed under
"Defense Assistance").
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1998, 105 Pub. L.
No. 118, § 525, 111 Stat 2386, 2413 (1997).
International Security and Development Coopera-
tion Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-113, § 726(b), (c),
95 Stat. 1519, 1554 (1981), as amended by Pub. L.
No. 99-83, sec. 715, § 726(c), 99 Stat. 190, 247
(1985) and Foreign Operations, Export Financing,
and Related Programs Appropriations Act Pub. L.
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No. 101-513, tit. V, § 544(b), 104 Stat. 1979, 2019
(1990) (also listed under "Chile" and "Human
Rights").
Trade
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-118, § 538, 111 Stat. 2386, 2417 (1997).
Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related
Programs Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-118, § 539, 111 Stat. 2386, 2417 (1997).
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 1428(a), 102 Stat. 1107,
1254 (1988).
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